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¿Qué gigantes? –dijo Sancho Panza. 
–Aquellos que allí ves –respondió su amo– de los brazos largos, que los suelen tener algunos de casi 
dos leguas. 
–Mire vuestra merced –respondió Sancho– que aquellos que allí se parecen no son gigantes, sino 
molinos de viento, y lo que en ellos parecen brazos son las aspas, que, volteadas del viento, hacen 
andar la piedra del molino. 
–Bien parece –respondió don Quijote– que no estás cursado en esto de las aventuras: ellos son 
gigantes; y si tienes miedo, quítate de ahí, y ponte en oración en el espacio que yo voy a entrar con 
ellos en fiera y desigual batalla. 
 
Don Quijote, Capítulo VII 
Miguel de Cervantes 
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RESUMO 
Costumamos fazer asserções quando proferimos sentenças indicativas como "Está 
chovendo". Mas, não toda proferição de uma sentença indicativa é uma asserção. Por 
exemplo, quando dissemos “vou voltar amanhã”, poderíamos estar fazendo uma 
promessa.  O que é fazer uma asserção? C.S. Peirce argumentou que "asseverar uma 
proposição é fazer-se responsável pela sua verdade" (CP 5.543). O propósito do presente 
texto é interpretar a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção assim como examinar as razões que a 
suportam. Para cumprir esse propósito, primeiro reconstruo e examino o argumento que, 
em defesa da sua visão, Peirce propôs em (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), e (CP 
5.546, 1908). A continuação aponto para três aspetos constitutivos dessa visão, a saber, a 
asserção como um ato que envolve certa responsabilidade, a proposição como o que é 
asseverado, e a responsabilidade pela verdade como a responsabilidade de dar razões. 
Tendo em consideração esses três aspetos, passo a defender as seguintes teses: (1) Peirce 
concebeu a responsabilidade envolvida na asserção como uma responsabilidade moral. (2) 
Peirce pensou que as proposições são types. (3) Peirce interpretou “responsabilidade de 
dar razões” de modo dialógico. Para finalizar, apresento duas objeções à visão de Peirce 
sobre a asserção e as réplicas respetivas. Concluo que a visão de Peirce sobre a asserção é 
uma contribuição valiosa ao debate filosófico sobre a asserção. 
Palavras chave: asserção, C.S. Peirce, proposições, semântica dialógica, pragmatismo 
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SUMMARY 
One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like “It is raining”. 
However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in 
uttering “I will be back tomorrow”, one might be making a promise. What is to make an 
assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that “to assert a proposition is to make oneself 
responsible for its truth” (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirce’s view of assertion and 
I evaluate Peirce’s reasons for holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirce’s 
case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 
1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirce’s view of assertion, 
namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as 
what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With 
respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the 
responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that 
propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of 
“responsibility to give reasons”. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirce’s 
view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirce’s account of 
assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion.  
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation concerns C.S. Peirce’s account of assertion. The noun 
“assertion” indicates a very common type of action. Suppose that Adriana and 
Joe are talking and she utters “Rio de Janeiro is to the north of São Paulo”. There 
are many ways one might describe the act performed by Adriana in uttering this 
sentence. One might say that Adriana has affirmed, claimed or stated that Rio de 
Janeiro is to the north of São Paulo. These several ways of describing the act 
performed by Adriana convey the same type of speech act, namely, asserting that-
so-and-so. Likewise, in different situations of everyday life, when speakers utter 
indicative sentences such as “Two plus two equals four” or “It is raining”, they 
are usually performing acts of assertion.  
However, one should observe that not every utterance of an indicative 
sentence is an act of assertion, for one can make several acts other than assertions 
by using indicative sentences, for example, promising, joking, practicing a 
language, rehearsing a line from a stage play, etc. Consider just two cases. On the 
one hand, consider acting. An actor on stage playing Polonius in Hamlet utters 
"Brevity is the soul of wit". Although he is uttering an indicative sentence, it is 
clear that he is not making an assertion. On the other hand, consider language 
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practicing. One may practice any language by uttering indicative sentences and 
not assert anything, for example, when one utters “La neige est blanche” to 
practice French pronunciation. I shall contrast these and similar cases with cases 
of genuine utterances of indicative sentences, such as when a historian utters 
“Napoleon was defeated in Waterloo”. I shall call the former cases “simulations”.  
Now, granting the distinction between simulations and genuine utterances 
of indicative sentences, if one excludes all cases of simulation, one might ask the 
following question: Are all genuine utterances of indicative sentences assertions? 
It seems not. Consider two examples. Suppose Joe is waiting for Adriana to eat 
supper and he utters “Dinner is served”. Here Joe is not asserting anything but 
requesting Adriana to come to the table. Likewise, consider the reply of a father to 
his teenage son in the following conversation:  
            Son: I’m going out.  
            Father: You will come back home at 10:00 p.m. 
In the above case, the father utters an indicative sentence, but he is not making an 
assertion; he is simply commanding his son to do something. Cases like these two 
show that there is not a one to one correspondence between utterances of 
sentences in the indicative mood and acts of assertion.  
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Hence, although assertion is a common type of action, the question 
concerning what qualifies a speech act as an assertion has no straightforward 
answer. In other words, it is clear that one usually makes assertions by using 
indicative sentences like “The cat is on the mat”. However, if one takes into 
account that there are cases of simulation and that there is not a one to one 
correspondence between the genuine utterances of sentences in the indicative 
mood and acts of assertion, it becomes clear that the act of uttering an indicative 
sentence is insufficient to perform a speech act of assertion.  
Accordingly, the following question is certainly not trivial: How should 
one understand the act of asserting? One might distinguish four broad kinds of 
answers to this question. Following McFarlane (2011), I shall formulate these four 
general views of assertion as follows:  
1. To assert is to express an attitude (e.g. Bach & Harnish (1979)). 
2. To assert is to make a move defined by its constitutive rules (e.g. 
Williamson (1996)). 
3. To assert is to propose to add information to the conversational common 
ground (e.g. Stalnaker (1999)). 
4. To assert is to undertake a commitment (e.g. Searle (2001); Brandom 
(1994)). 
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The above views have shaped the dialectics of the contemporary debate on 
assertion.1 Notably, one can find the roots of (4) in Peirce’s view that “to assert a 
proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth” (CP 5.543). My aim in 
this dissertation is to interpret Peirce’s view of assertion and to evaluate his 
reasons for holding it. In other words, I intend to expound Peirce’s account of 
assertion.  
Why is the project of expounding Peirce’s account of assertion 
worthwhile? I have found at least three good reasons lending importance and 
relevance to this project. I shall elaborate on them briefly.  
First, the concept of assertion played a central role in Peirce’s attempt to 
revisit his logic and philosophy of logic in his later philosophy. On the field of 
logic, Peirce major achievement, besides the introduction of quantifiers and 
bound variables in his 1895 paper “On the algebra of logic: A contribution to the 
philosophy of notation”, is the system of Existential Graphs (EGs), partially 
introduced in his 1906 paper “Prolegomena to an apology for pragmaticism”. 
EGs is a set of diagrammatic systems comprising propositional logic (Alpha 
graphs), first order logic (Beta graphs) and modal logic (Gamma graphs). 
                                                             
1 My purpose in enumerating these views is merely to sketch the dialectical situation of the 
contemporary debate of assertion and Peirce’s influence on it. For a comprehensive exposition of 
the contemporary debate on assertion, see Brown & Cappelen (2011) and Pagin (2015). 
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According to Peirce, logicians draw EGs on a sheet of assertion, which represents 
the universe of discourse. The graph that logicians draw on the sheet of assertion 
constitutes a sign that can be asserted or, in Peirce’s use of the term, a 
“proposition”. In addition, Peirce offered a semantics for the universal and 
existential quantifier in terms of assertion dialogues (EP 2.168, 1903).  
With respect to Peirce’s philosophy of logic, it is relevant to mention that 
Peirce rethought crucial logical concepts in terms of assertion. For example, in an 
effort to reject psychologism in logic, he understood judgment as “assertion to 
oneself” (EP 2.140, 1903), and, as I have mentioned, he characterized the 
proposition neither as a psychological nor as an abstract entity but as “a sign 
capable of being asserted” (CP 8.337, 1904). Furthermore, in his mature 
philosophy, Peirce explained his celebrated pragmatic maxim, which Peirce 
regarded as a maxim of logic, in terms of assertion: “the method prescribed in the 
maxim is to trace out in the imagination the conceivable practical consequences, 
– that is, the consequences for deliberate, self-controlled conduct, – of the 
affirmation or denial of the concept" (CP 8.191).2 Thus, given the role of assertion 
in Peirce’s logic and philosophy of logic, assertion is arguably one of the most 
important notions within Peirce’s later philosophy.  
                                                             
2 See also (EP 2.332). 
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Second, as I have suggested, Peirce’s view of assertion has been influential 
in the contemporary philosophical debate on assertion. For example, Searle holds 
that “asserting commits the speaker to the truth of the proposition asserted” 
(2001:147) and Brandom argues that “to treat a performance as an assertion is to 
treat it as the undertaking or acknowledging of a certain kind of commitment […]” 
(1994:142). Views such as these, which focus on the normative effect of asserting, 
are called in the literature “commitment accounts” of assertion.3  
Third, Peirce’s account of assertion is one of the most neglected aspects of 
his philosophy. As far as I know, Chauviré (1979) is the only article directly 
concerning Peirce’s account of assertion. In addition, no paper in the fifty years 
of publication history of Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society is entirely 
devoted to address Peirce’s account of assertion. However, it is worth to mention 
that there are some indirect but remarkable treatments of Peirce’s account of 
assertion, namely, Hilpinen (1982; 1992; 1995), Pape (2002), and Atkin (2011).  
It becomes clear that the relevance of expounding Peirce’s account of 
assertion is threefold. Firstly, it would help us understand better the later work 
Peirce developed on logic and philosophy of logic given the role of assertion 
                                                             
3 See also Searle (1969:29, 1979:12); Brandom (1983); Wright (1992); Marion (2012); McFarlane 
(2005); and Watson (2004). For a compact introduction to the commitment account of assertion, 
see MacFarlane (2011:90).  
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within these core areas of his thought. Secondly, it would help us understand 
better the core idea behind contemporary commitment accounts of assertion 
since it involves an interpretation of Peirce’s view and an assessment of Peirce’s 
reasons for understanding assertion in terms of the undertaking of a certain kind 
of responsibility. Thirdly, it would constitute a first step towards a more 
comprehensive study of Peirce’s account of assertion given the little attention 
Peirce’s view of assertion has drawn among Peirce scholars. 
So far, I have presented the problem and motivations behind the present 
thesis. In the remaining part of this introduction, I would like to outline its 
thematic core. I will proceed as follows. First, I will address some matters of 
interpretation as well as certain issues concerning the textual evidence, and, 
second, I will summarize the main thrust of each one of the chapters.  
Let me return to Peirce’s formulation of his view of assertion in (CP 5.543): 
“to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth”. The way 
Peirce phrased this formulation is revealing. Here he said of assertion that it is a 
kind of doing. Indeed, Peirce’s use of the expression “to make oneself 
responsible” conveys that speakers are doing something when they assert a 
proposition, namely, they undertake a certain kind of responsibility. Peirce 
added the expression “for truth” in order to specify the sort of responsibility 
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involved in assertion. The driving thought behind this specification seems to be 
that if what one asserts are propositions, which are the primary bearers of truth 
and falsity, then the relevant sort of responsibility involved in an act of assertion 
must be that for the truth of the proposition asserted. Thus, so formulated, one 
can identify three aspects structuring Peirce’s view of assertion: (i) assertion as a 
speech act involving a certain kind of responsibility,4 (ii) propositions as what is 
assertable, and (iii) undertaking a responsibility for the truth of a proposition as 
what qualifies the act of assertion.  
However, in (CP 5.543) Peirce formulated but not accounted for his view 
of assertion. He introduced his account of assertion in three passages from 
unpublished manuscripts, namely, (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 
5.546, 1908). Peirce’s account of assertion, as it is presented in these passages, 
might be outlined as follows: Peirce inspected paradigmatic cases of assertion in 
order to identify in a perspicuous way the essential effect of performing an act of 
assertion in linguistic communication. He considered that the suitable candidates 
for paradigmatic assertions are solemn assertions. Accordingly, in each one of the 
aforementioned passages, Peirce inspected each one of the following cases 
                                                             
4 Here I use the term “speech act” in the sense of an utterance considered as an action, 
particularly with regard to its effect. This use of the term is clearly applicable to Peirce’s view of 
assertion. As such, it has no direct relation to Austin’s celebrated speech act theory (see Austin 
(1962)).  
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respectively: using the expression “You bet” (e.g. uttering “You bet that Joe was 
at the bar last night”); making an affidavit (e.g. writing the sentence “Joe was at 
the bar last night” in a document confirmed by oath); and taking an oath (e.g. 
uttering “I swear that Joe was at the bar last night” in court).  
According to Peirce, his inspection shows that in each one of these cases 
the normative status of speakers change by solemnly asserting a proposition. 
This change consists in the acquisition of certain responsibility: whenever one 
asserts a proposition p, one thereby acquires a responsibility for the truth of p. 
What means “responsibility for truth”? For Peirce, “being responsible for the 
truth of a proposition” means “being responsible to give reasons for the 
proposition asserted”.5 I shall call this specific sort of responsibility “vindicatory 
commitment”.  
For Peirce, the outcome of his inspection lends enough plausibility to the 
claim that the acquisition of a vindicatory commitment is what qualifies a speech 
act as an assertion. For example, suppose that Maria asks, “Where is the cat?” 
and Tim replies, “The cat is on the sofa”. In doing so, Tim has made a move in a 
dialogue for which he has acquired a certain duty, namely, Tim has committed 
himself to give reasons for the proposition that the cat is on the sofa. Indeed, 
                                                             
5 See (CP 5.546). 
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Maria is entitled to ask him, “How do you know?”. In that case, he may defend 
such proposition by replying, “I have just seen the cat” or “Come here and 
look!”. 
As the above outline of Peirce’s account of assertion shows, aspect (iii) of 
his view can be glossed as a vindicatory commitment. Yet it is not entirely clear 
what he means by “giving reasons”. In addition, Peirce did not say much 
concerning (i) and (ii). With respect to (i), he showed that asserting a proposition 
involves a certain responsibility, but he did not specify the nature of such 
responsibility. With respect to (ii), he distinguished between a proposition and its 
assertion, and simply assumed that the proposition is what is assertable. Hence, 
although in the aforementioned passages Peirce offered good insights into the 
three aspects structuring his view of assertion, a clearer and elaborated picture of 
them requires a deal of interpretation.  
As a result, I will structure the bulk of the present work according to these 
three aspects of Peirce’s view of assertion and I will defend an interpretation of 
each one of them based on the textual evidence at hand. It is thus in order to note 
a relevant issue concerning this textual evidence: (EP 2.140), (EP 2.312), and (CP 
5.546) concern topics other than assertion. As a result, Peirce made compact, 
almost en passant, comments on assertion in all three manuscripts. In order to 
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compensate for the absence of an elaborated and unified text in which Peirce 
fleshed out his account of assertion, I followed the common practice in Peirce 
scholarship of selecting additional passages as supplementary textual evidence. 
The criterion I used to select such evidence is chronological: all passages belong 
to Peirce’s later philosophy, which may be roughly dated between the years 1902 
to 1914.  
Lastly, I turn to the structure of this thesis and the interpretation of 
Peirce’s view of assertion I will defend. The aim of Chapter 1 is to reconstruct 
and discuss Peirce’s account of assertion as it is presented in (EP 2.140), (EP 
2.312), and (CP 5.546), which constitutes the main textual evidence available on 
this matter. In section 1.2., I discuss and assess Peirce’s methodological approach 
to the question concerning the nature of assertion. In section 1.3., I discuss and 
elaborate on Peirce’s inspection of three paradigmatic cases of assertion. Finally, 
in section 1.4., I assess the outcome of Peirce’s inspection, which is that assertion 
is characterized by the undertaking of a certain kind of responsibility (i.e. to 
assert a proposition p is to commit oneself to vindicate p), and I set the agenda for 
the next chapters by distinguishing three aspects of Peirce’s view of assertion 
that require further elucidation, namely, (i), (ii) and (iii).  
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The aim of Chapter 2 is to elaborate on (i). Peirce held that assertion is an 
act involving a certain kind of responsibility. Here “responsibility” has at least 
two possible interpretations. In the first sense of “responsibility”, one is 
responsible in virtue of performing an act of assertion because such act is 
considered either acceptable or unacceptable to most members of a society. In the 
second sense of “responsibility”, one is responsible in virtue of performing an act 
of assertion because asserters are moral agents. I shall call these two 
interpretations the conventional interpretation and the moral interpretation, 
respectively.  
One should note that both interpretations assume that Peirce considered 
the act of assertion from the perspective of its effect in linguistic communication 
and, as a result, he came to the view that performing an assertion essentially 
involves the overt undertaking of a responsibility on the part of the speaker. The 
point of disagreement between these interpretations concerns Peirce’s view of the 
nature of the responsibility involved in asserting.  
The conventional interpretation contends that Peirce construed it as a 
conventional responsibility while the moral interpretation contends that Peirce 
construed it as a moral responsibility. Based on the textual evidence found in (CP 
5.546, 1908), which shows that Peirce held that one is responsible in virtue of 
13 
 
 
asserting a proposition because one is morally liable for the harm one could 
cause to one’s listener if the proposition one asserted is false, I will defend a 
moral interpretation.  
In section 2.2., I clarify the sense of the conventional interpretation and the 
moral interpretation of responsibility. In section 2.3., I argue for the claim that 
Peirce was committed to a moral interpretation. In section 2.4., I make some 
qualifications regarding the plausibility of this claim.  
The goal of Chapter 3 is to elaborate on (ii). Here I attempt to understand 
Peirce’s claim that propositions are signs capable of being asserted. In particular, 
I contend that Peirce meant by this claim that the criteria of identity of 
propositions depends on its potential assertion. Peirce thought that propositions, 
qua signs, are types. If Joe asserts that Adriana is clever, he is predicating of 
Adriana certain characteristic, namely, that she has a quick-witted intelligence. 
The main thrust of Peirce’s view of propositions as types is that predication is a 
type of act: if Joe performs an act of assertion by means of uttering the sentence 
“Adriana is smart”, he is producing a token of a type, namely, the type of action 
of applying the predicate “smart” to Adriana. For Peirce, such “propositional act-
type” is the proposition that Adriana is clever.  
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Yet, Peirce thought that propositions, so understood, have no existence: 
every type requires tokens. As such, propositions are tied to speech acts, in 
particular, acts of assertion. Peirce explained the intimate relation between 
propositions and assertions in the following terms: asserting a proposition hic et 
nunc relates to certain actions that would lead the speaker and the listener to 
identify what the speaker is talking about and to determine whether or not what 
the speaker is saying about it applies. As such, propositions are assertable act-
types. I base my case for this contention on (EP 2.311-312, 1904), (CP 2.357), (CP 
2.292, 1902), and (EP 2.168).  
In section 3.2., I introduce Peirce’s view of the proposition as a sign. Peirce 
meant by the word “sign” a triadic relation of the form “x is a sign of y to z”, 
where x ranges over sign-vehicles (i.e. a sign’s physical form such as a sound, a 
printed word, an image, etc.), y ranges over “objects” (i.e. the members of the 
universe of discourse, which is specified by the context of utterance), and z 
ranges over “interpretants” (i.e. what is interpreted of the object by means of the 
sign-vehicle). Consider, for example, Dafoe’s Robinson Crusoe and the footprint 
in the sand. The footprint is a sign-vehicle of its object, which is the person who 
made the footprint, and the interpretant is what is interpreted of the object by 
means of the footprint. Naturally, Crusoe interpreted the footprint as sign of the 
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existence of a human being, and thus he worried that “someone else was on the 
island”. Following Peirce’s view of the sign, I distinguish three aspects of 
propositions, namely, propositions as sign-vehicles, propositions as being about 
something that is signified, and propositions as signifying elements. In the 
succeeding sections of this chapter, I elaborate on these three aspects.  
In section 3.3., I show that Peirce held that propositions qua signs are 
types. Then, I elaborate on the type-token distinction as applied to propositions. 
In section 3.4., I address some aspects of the relation between propositions and 
whatever it is that they are of or concern in virtue of being used in assertoric 
practice. Finally, in section 3.5., I explore the intimate relation between 
propositions and assertability according to Peirce.  
In Chapter 4, I elaborate on (iii). Here I attempt to understand Peirce’s 
construal of “responsibility for truth” as a vindicatory commitment by tackling 
the following question: How is one expected to honor one’s responsibility to 
vindicate a proposition? I will defend that Peirce held a dialogical interpretation 
of “vindicatory commitment”. One can conceive a dialogue between a speaker 
and a listener as a succession of moves. Each move consists in performing a 
speech act, for example, questioning or asserting.  
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Accordingly, the dialogical interpretation of “vindicatory commitment” 
hinges on two views: (1) the relation between the speaker and the listener is a 
symmetrical relation, and (2) the speaker and the listener have a first-person and 
second-person perspective, respectively. My contention is that Peirce attempted 
to understand the notion of vindicatory commitment in terms of the speaker’s 
duty to give reasons and the listener’s right to ask for reasons. This view does 
justice to Peirce’s idea that the responsibility involved in assertion is not an all-
or-nothing matter: assertion, as a socially normative act, can be accompanied by 
challenge and retraction. I base my case for this view on Peirce’s comments on 
quantifiers in (CP 2.523), (CP 2.453), and (EP 2.168).  
In section 4.2., I will outline Peirce’s dialogical semantics for the 
quantifiers. In section 4.3., I will clarify further the import of the implicit rules 
governing the correct assertoric use of quantified sentences by considering two 
examples given by Peirce. In doing so, I will show that (1) and (2) follow from 
Peirce's dialogical semantics for the quantifiers. Finally, in section 4.4., I will 
elaborate on Peirce’s view of the relation between assertion, so understood, and 
truth.   
In Chapter 5, I present two objections to Peirce’s view of assertion. In 
section 5.2., I introduce the first objection, which is due to Pagin (2004). 
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According to Pagin, the assertoric utterance of an explicit performative sentence 
cannot substitute the assertoric utterance of an indicative sentence in inference. 
For example, according to Pagin, the assertoric utterance of “I commit myself to 
the truth of the proposition that Rome is to the north of Naples” cannot 
substitute the assertoric utterance of “Rome is to the north of Naples“ in the 
inference “Rome is to the north of Naples. If Rome is to the north of Naples, then 
Rome is to the north of Sicily. Therefore, Rome is to the north of Sicily” in a truth-
preserving way. As a result, he concludes that views of assertion such as that of 
Peirce are inadequate: although explicit performative sentences expressing a 
commitment to the truth of a proposition should count as assertions, they do not 
work as assertions in inference. In section 5.2.1., I reply to this objection by using 
Peirce’s distinction between a proposition and its assertion as well as Peirce’s 
view of propositions. In short, I argue that in uttering “I commit myself to the 
truth of the proposition that Rome is to the north of Naples” and “Rome is to the 
north of Naples“, one can produce two different tokens of the same proposition-
type. 
In section 5.3., I introduce the second objection. MacFarlane (2011) argued 
that if one understands “responsibility for truth” in terms of the notion of 
vindicatory commitment, one can find cases in which one undertakes the duty to 
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vindicate a proposition but one does not assert such proposition. For example, it 
seems that a lawyer who commits to vindicate the innocence of a client does not 
assert that the client is innocent. Accordingly, he suggests that the notion of 
vindicatory commitment is insufficient to characterize the speech act of assertion. 
In section 5.3.1., I use Peirce’s dialogical interpretation of vindicatory 
commitment to reply to this objection. In short, I will argue that the case of the 
defense lawyer might be one of assertion and disbelief. 
I conclude that Peirce’s idea of understanding assertion in terms of its 
normative effect promises to shed light on the distinctive character of assertoric 
acts. I note that Peirce’s account of assertion does not amount to something like a 
proof that the picture of assertion it delivers is correct. It rather shows how to 
understand assertive acts based on the simple idea that they have a particular 
normative effect on the speaker. 
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Chapter 1 
  
What is to make an Assertion?  
 
1.1.  Introduction 
Suppose that Helen asks Maria for something to drink, and Maria utters the 
sentence “There is a bottle of beer in the freezer”. By means of uttering this 
sentence, Maria is asserting that there is a bottle of beer in the freezer. Yet, what 
exactly one means by saying that Maria is asserting that-so-and-so? In general, 
what one is doing when one asserts a proposition? Peirce’s answer to this 
question is that the act of asserting a proposition consists in making oneself 
responsible for its truth. In the present chapter, I will introduce Peirce’s account 
of assertion as it is presented in (EP 2.140), (EP 2.312-313) and (CP 5.546). 
Accordingly, I begin section 1.2. by presenting how Peirce tackled the 
question concerning the nature of assertion. In short, Peirce’s methodological 
approach to discern the feature that qualifies a speech act as an assertion consists 
in inspecting paradigmatic cases of assertion, namely, solemn assertions such as 
taking an oath. Then, I continue by clarifying why Peirce took solemn assertions 
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as paradigmatic cases of assertions and evaluating the cogency of his 
methodological approach.  
In section 1.3., I aim to reconstruct Peirce’s inspection of three 
paradigmatic cases of assertion. The rationale for this reconstruction is twofold. 
Firstly, it explains how Peirce came to his view of assertion. Secondly, it displays 
the main elements structuring Peirce’s view of assertion in a perspicuous way.  
Finally, in section 1.4., I discuss the outcome of Peirce’s inspection, which 
is that the most prominent feature of asserting is its normative effect on the 
speaker: whenever one asserts a proposition p, one undertakes a responsibility to 
do something, namely, one makes oneself responsible to give reasons for p. 
According to Peirce, such feature is what qualifies the speech act of assertion. 
 
1.2. Peirce’s methodological approach 
Peirce thought that the adequate methodological approach to identify the 
characteristic feature of the speech act of assertion is inspecting paradigmatic 
cases of assertion. Peirce first introduced this approach in the Harvard Lectures: 
“Now it is fairly easy problem to analyze the nature of assertion. To find an easily 
dissected example, we shall naturally take a case where the assertive element is 
magnified,-a very formal assertion, such as an affidavit” (EP 2.140). A year later, 
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in “Kaina Stoicheia”, written in 1904, Peirce introduced this approach in the 
following way: “As an aid in dissecting the constitution of affirmation I shall 
employ a certain logical magnifying glass that I have often found efficient in such 
business” (EP 2.312). Finally, in an untitled manuscript from 1908, which 
constitutes Peirce’s most extensive and lucid discussion of assertion, he used this 
approach one last time:  
What is the nature of assertion? We have no magnifying-glass that can 
enlarge its features, and render them more discernible; but in default of 
such an instrument we can select for examination a very formal 
assertion, the features of which have purposely been rendered very 
prominent, in order to emphasize its solemnity. If a man desires to 
assert anything very solemnly, he takes such steps as will enable him to 
go before a magistrate or notary and take a binding oath to it. (CP 
5.546) 
The above textual evidence suggests that Peirce’s methodological approach to the 
question concerning the nature of assertion seeks to “magnify” or display the 
main features of the act of assertion as clearly as possible by inspecting cases of 
solemn assertion. Indeed, in each of the aforementioned passages, Peirce 
continued his exposition by inspecting each of the following cases of solemn 
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assertion, respectively: the use of the vernacular phrase “you bet”, making an 
affidavit, and taking an oath.  
Why Peirce took solemn assertions as natural candidates for paradigmatic 
cases of assertion? Solemn assertions are severe and dignified speech acts 
performed in accordance to public standards of correction. For example, suppose 
that you ask someone on the street “Is Mario’s Restaurant on Arthur Avenue?” 
and the person replies “You bet it is”. It would not be difficult for you to evaluate 
whether this person asserted correctly or incorrectly once you get to Arthur 
Avenue. Given the familiarity and robustness of the cases selected by Peirce, it 
becomes clear that the driving thought behind taking solemn assertions as 
paradigmatic assertions is that they are more suitable for examination than 
ordinary assertions. According to Peirce, solemn assertions are enhanced 
assertions, as it were. 
Nevertheless, Peirce not just held that solemn assertions are more suitable 
for examination than ordinary assertions. He went a step further by also holding 
that a rigorous inspection of cases of solemn assertion is enough to identify 
perspicuously the distinctive feature of assertoric acts. In other words, Peirce’s 
approach to the question concerning the nature of assertion is rooted on the 
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following methodological view: if one inquiries into the essential effect of 
making a solemn assertion, one might understand the distinctive character of the 
speech act of assertion. Thus, the aim of Peirce’s approach is to understand the 
meaning of “assertion” by inquiring the import of the act itself instead of 
attempting to reach an adequate definition in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions.6  
However, at this point the issue concerning the cogency of Peirce’s 
methodological approach arises. If Peirce held that inspecting paradigmatic cases 
of assertion is sufficient to identify the distinctive feature of assertoric acts, then 
he assumed that ordinary assertions sufficiently resemble its paradigms, namely, 
solemn assertions. What lends plausibility to this assumption? Peirce did not 
consider this question. However, the image of a “magnified” or “exaggerated” 
assertion gives us a good hint on where to stand regarding this assumption. 
Since the cogency of Peirce’s inspection hinges on such assumption, I shall 
examine it before introducing Peirce’s inspection of three paradigmatic cases of 
solemn assertion.  
                                                             
6 As Hilpinen remarks, Peirce’s methodological approach constitutes an interesting alternative to 
“the attempts to characterize concepts by necessary and sufficient conditions: the latter method 
has often prompted philosophers to be excessively concerned about ‘difficult’ and borderline 
cases, which has sometimes hampered fruitful philosophical theorizing” Hilpinen (1995:274). 
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Let me begin by briefly elaborating on the meaning of Peirce’s assumption 
that ordinary assertions resemble solemn assertions. Suppose, for example, that 
Helen utters the following sentences: 
(1) I swear that Louie was lecturing when the murder took place. 
(2) I claim that Louie was lecturing when the murder took place. 
Now, if the utterances of (1) and (2) constitute different ways of performing the 
same speech act, namely to assert that Louie was lecturing when the murder took 
place, then (1) and (2) sufficiently resemble each other. How one can show the 
plausibility of the claim that the utterances of (1) and (2) constitute different ways 
of performing the same speech act?  
Under close examination, it is possible to discern that Peirce’s suggestion 
that solemn assertions are magnified assertions has a linguistic counterpart. 
Verbs such as “swear” and “claim” belong to the category of assertive verbs. 
Some English verbs that function as assertive verbs are: assert, affirm, state, 
inform, report, predict, remind, assure, and certify.7  
Yet there is a distinction between assertive verbs concerning the strength 
of their asserting. Indeed, verbs like “testify” and “swear” are strong assertive 
                                                             
7 For an extensive list of assertive verbs, see Searle and Vandervaken (1985). See also Hooper 
(1975) for a lucid treatment of assertive verbs from a linguistic point of view. It is worth to notice 
that Hooper uses the notion of “degree of commitment” to characterize assertive verbs.  
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verbs while verbs like “claim” and “maintain” are normal assertive verbs. The 
assertive element of the former verbs is “very prominent”, as Peirce said, while 
the assertive element of the latter verbs is moderate but sufficiently conspicuous.8 
It becomes clear that (1) is a case of solemn assertion and (2) is a simple case of 
assertion. In addition, it is clear that a solemn assertion like (1) is stronger than an 
ordinary assertion like (2). In other words, testifying is a stronger mode of 
asserting than claiming. 
In the light of this linguistic evidence, it is plausible to conclude that 
although there is a distinction between assertive verbs concerning the strength of 
their asserting, all assertive verbs constitute different ways of making assertions. 
Hence, it is plausible to assume that ordinary assertions sufficiently resemble its 
paradigms. 
I should clarify that I am not claiming that Peirce had in mind this exact 
line of argument for the assumption that ordinary assertions resemble solemn 
assertions. Rather, I claim that the above textual evidence, in which one finds 
Peirce using an image of solemn assertions as exaggerated assertions, makes such 
line of argument adequate to support this assumption.  
                                                             
8 Of course, it is possible to recognize “weak” assertive verbs such as “conjecture”, “hypothesize”, 
etc., in which the assertive element is smaller than in normal assertive verbs, but no smaller for 
being unnoticed. 
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According to the above considerations, one can gloss Peirce’s 
methodological approach concerning the question about the nature of assertion 
as follows: one performs speech acts of assertion by means of using assertive 
verbs. One should note, though, that there is a difference between solemn 
assertions and ordinary assertions. In performing a solemn assertion, one 
employs a strong assertive verb. By contrast, in performing an ordinary assertion, 
one employs a normal assertive verb. In spite of this difference, it is clear that 
solemn assertions and ordinary assertions sufficiently resemble each other. 
Solemn assertions are enhanced assertions, as it were, because their features are 
intended to be perspicuous as required by their public use. Thus, it is sufficient to 
inspect cases of solemn assertion in order to identify the characteristic effect of 
assertion.  
So far, I have clarified why Peirce took solemn assertions as paradigmatic 
cases of assertions and I have evaluated the cogency of his methodological 
approach. I shall turn now to Peirce’s inspection of three cases of solemn 
assertion.  
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1.3. Peirce’s inspection of paradigmatic cases of assertion 
1.3.1. Case 1: Making an affidavit 
In the manuscript “Koina Stoicheia”, Peirce addressed en passant the question 
concerning the nature of assertion. He inspected a form of solemn assertion, 
making an affidavit, in order to specify the feature that qualifies a speech act as 
an assertion.9 He wrote:   
Imagine, then, that I write a proposition in a piece of paper, perhaps a 
number of times, simply as a calligraphic exercise. It is not likely to prove 
dangerous amusement. But suppose I afterward carry the paper before a 
notary public and make an affidavit of its contents. That may prove to be a 
horse of another color. The reason is that this affidavit may be used to 
determine an assent to the proposition it contains in the minds of judge and 
jury;-an effect that the paper would not have if I had not sworn to it. For 
certain penalties here and hereafter are attached to swearing to a false 
proposition; and consequently the fact that I have sworn to it will be taken 
as a negative index that it is not false. (EP 2.312) 
                                                             
9 In his 1843 book Questions and Answers on Law, Kinne characterizes an affidavit as follows: “An 
affidavit, generally speaking, is an oath in writing sworn before some person who hath authority 
to administer such oath. […] Affidavits ought to set the matter of fact only, which the party 
intends to prove by his affidavits; […]” Kinne (1843:13).  
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Peirce distinguished here between writing a sentence as a calligraphic exercise 
and making an affidavit by means of using such sentence. This distinction is just 
a case of the general distinction between merely uttering a sentence, for example, 
as a means for practicing calligraphy, and asserting that so-and-so by means of 
uttering such sentence. By “utterance”, I mean any spatio-temporal item by 
means of which a speaker makes a speech act, in particular, an act of assertion.10 
This may be a vocalization (i.e. an oral utterance), or an inscription (i.e. a written 
utterance).11 What is the import of Peirce’s distinction? 
The case Peirce considered above attempts to show that there is an 
essential difference between merely uttering a sentence and uttering such 
sentence as a means for asserting something. According to Peirce, writing down a 
sentence in a piece of paper has no effect in linguistic communication while 
making an affidavit has a clear effect on the normative status of its performer 
(i.e. the performer of an affidavit becomes responsible for the truth of a 
proposition). Thus, the identity criteria of the act of writing down a sentence in a 
                                                             
10 In what follows, I will mainly use the terms “speaker” and “listener” to refer to the performer 
of an assertion and the addressee of that assertion, respectively. However, Peirce uses several 
other terms as synonymous to “speaker” and “listener”. Thus, depending on the context, I will 
use as synonymous of “speaker” the terms “asserter” and “utterer” and as synonymous of 
“listener” the terms “hearer”, “addressee” and “interpreter”.  
11 It also includes a physical gesture or sequence of gestures as in sign languages. For example, 
the hand signals used by commandos to indicate the position of the enemy, etc. For this sort of 
case see MacFarlane (2011).  
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piece of paper and the act of making an affidavit by means of such inscription 
are different. By “identity criterion”, I mean the standard by which one judges 
the identity of an act. Let me elaborate on this point by way of an example.  
Suppose that Helen utters the sentence “Socrates loves Xanthippe”. In 
uttering this sentence, it is clear that she is articulating a sentence formed of 
words in the English language and using such sentence to assert that Socrates 
loves Xanthippe. Although in making such assertion she thereby utters a 
sentence, the identity criteria of these acts are different. Helen can perform the 
same act of assertion in the performance of two different utterance acts if she 
utters either “Socrates loves Xanthippe” in English or “Sócrates ama Xântipe” in 
Portuguese. Moreover, this may happen in the same language. For example, 
suppose Helen uses synonymous sentences such as “Socrates loves Xanthippe” 
and “Xanthippe is loved by Socrates” to perform the same act of assertion. 
Furthermore, an utterance act can be performed without performing an act of 
assertion. For example, when one writes the sentence “Socrates loves Xanthippe” 
as a calligraphic exercise like in Peirce’s example.  
The fact that utterances and assertions have different identity criteria 
motivates the introduction of the distinction between assertoric acts and 
utterance acts. An utterance act consists simply in the utterance of a linguistic 
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expression. I take that the textual evidence just discussed lends plausibility to the 
claim that Peirce entertained this distinction.  
I return now to the passage. Granting the distinction between utterance 
acts and assertoric acts, it is clear that the act of writing a sentence has no effect 
per se. It only provides a means of asserting something. Thus, Peirce’s main point 
seems to be that the act of making an affidavit, in contrast with the mere act of 
writing a sentence, essentially involves a responsibility for the truth of a 
proposition on the part of its performer.   
Performers of affidavits acquire such responsibility because they overtly 
endorse and recommend propositions by means of performing those acts. Peirce 
claimed that making an affidavit generates assent to the proposition asserted. By 
“assent”, Peirce meant “[…] an act of the mind by which one endeavors to 
impress the meaning of the proposition upon his [the addressee’s] disposition, 
so that it shall govern his conduct, including thought under conduct […]” (EP 
2.278). Accordingly, if one assents to a proposition, one is disposed to use it in 
practical reasoning and action as would be manifested in suitable circumstances. 
Since believing a false proposition can derive in negative consequences for 
cognition and action, endorsing and recommending a proposition has a clear 
effect on one’s normative status, for one becomes accountable in case the 
31 
 
 
proposition asserted turns out to be false.12 Let me elaborate on this point by way 
of an example.  
Consider a child custody case. John Doe, a social worker, is appointed to 
evaluate the parental skills of Bill Smith, a father fighting the joint custody of his 
children. In the presence of Smith’s attorney, John Doe makes the following 
affidavit: 
 
The judge allowed Smith to visit his children on weekends without supervision. 
Evidently, the judge assented to the propositions Doe asserted and made his 
decision based on them. Suppose now that Doe did not see Bill Smith interacting 
                                                             
12 In Chapter 2, I will clarify the sense in which an asserter is accountable in virtue of asserting a 
proposition.  
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with his children. Doe made an incorrect assertion and is thereby accountable for 
the negative consequences the decision of the judge may have for Smith’s 
children. 
As this example illustrates, making an affidavit is an act that can be 
evaluated either as correct or incorrect. One incorrectly makes an affidavit if one 
states a false proposition. And there are penalties for those who make affidavits 
in case the proposition asserted turns out to be false, for addressees might be 
negatively affected if they assent to false propositions. As Peirce suggested, this 
is why one presumes that those who make affidavits are making correct 
assertions. 
Let me recapitulate. One can draw two main points from Peirce’s 
inspection of making an affidavit. The first point is that there is a distinction 
between utterance acts and assertoric acts. The former kind of acts has no 
consequences for their performers. By contrast, the latter kind of acts has a clear 
effect: in making an affidavit, one generates assent one’s listeners and, in turn, 
assent relates to practical reasoning and action. The second point is that asserters 
are accountable for the negative consequences ensuing in case the propositions 
they assert turn out to be false. Thus, in making an affidavit, one acquires an 
overt responsibility for the truth of what one says. 
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1.3.2. Case 2: The use of the expression “You bet”  
In the first of the Harvard Lectures on pragmatism, delivered in the spring of 1903, 
Peirce wrote:   
What is the difference between making an assertion and laying a wager. 
Both acts whereby the agent deliberately subjects himself to evil 
consequences if certain proposition is not true. Only when he offers to bet he 
hopes the other man will make himself responsible in the same way for the 
truth of the contrary proposition; while when he makes an assertion he 
always (or almost always) wishes the man to whom he makes it to be led to 
do what he does. Accordingly, in our vernacular “I will bet you so” is the 
phrase expressive of a private opinion which one does not expect others to 
share, while “You bet__” is a form of assertion intended to cause another to 
follow suit. Such them seems at least in a preliminary glance at the matter to 
be a satisfactory account of assertion. (EP 2.140) 
Here Peirce putted forward a comparison between asserting by means of using 
the expression “you bet”, followed by an indicative sentence, and wagering.13 An 
assertion is similar to a wager in respect to the negative consequences ensuing if 
                                                             
13 I will clarify the sense of the expression “you bet” in what follows. However, for the sake of 
clarity, I shall mention from the outset that one should not conflate Peirce’s use of the expression 
with the idiom “You bet” as it is used in US English as an informal response to “Thank you”. 
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the proposition at stake in each case turns out to be false. For example, suppose 
that a soccer match between Brazil and Italy is above to take place. Helen wagers 
against Italy and Tim wagers against Brazil for a sum of $1.000. It turns out that 
Brazil won the match. Consequently, Tim should accept the negative 
consequences ensuing from the falsity of the proposition that Italy won the 
soccer match against Brazil, namely, paying Helen $1.000.  
A similar situation applies in the case of assertion. Suppose that Helen 
asks Tim “Where is the dog?” and he replies by asserting that the dog is on the 
garden. Tim exposes himself to the criticism (and maybe the anger) of Helen if 
the dog were on the neighbor’s house. This point regarding assertion was 
already present in the case of making an affidavit: the performer of an affidavit 
is accountable for the negative consequences ensuing if the proposition asserted 
is false. However, in spite of being a form of solemn assertion, the case of using 
“you bet” is not bound to a legal setting. The point here is that in social settings 
one criticizes those speakers who either assert false propositions or assert 
propositions without committing themselves to defend them.  
In addition, asserting and wagering are different in respect to their 
interpersonal aspects. According to Peirce, if one wagers by using the expression 
“I will bet you so”, as in “I will bet you so that Brazil losses the match”, one is 
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clearly not inviting one’s addressee to follow suit. On the contrary, one expects 
the addressee to take responsibility for the truth of the opposite proposition (e.g. 
Italy losses the match). Otherwise, one would be betting against oneself. For 
example, Helen expected Tim to make himself responsible for the truth of the 
proposition that Italy won the soccer match against Brazil.14 In this sense, 
wagering expresses “a private opinion”: wagers reserve their reasons or motives 
to get into a bet.  
By contrast, the interpersonal aspect of assertion involves the addressee: 
when one asserts a proposition, one expects the addressee to follow suit, for one 
is publicly endorsing such proposition. Let me elaborate on this point. One can 
gloss the form of assertion “You bet that p” as “you may be sure that p” or 
“certainly p”, and one may regard it as equivalent to “I assure you that p”.15 In 
performing this form of assertion, a speaker overtly recommends the listener to 
conform to the proposition asserted. Presumably, this is what Peirce meant 
when he claimed that using the expression “You bet” is a form of assertion 
                                                             
14 Of course, for the purposes of this example, I am assuming that Helen and Tim are not betting 
for mere affiliation to their teams; I assume they are betting based on relevant factors that would 
contribute to an outcome such as statistics, performance of the teams in the last games, the health 
of the players, etc. 
15 The 1868 magazine “The New Eclectic” is the oldest reference I have found of the expression 
“you bet”: “It may be necessary to add, for the information of English readers, that the expression 
‘you bet!’ is a Californian contraction of the sentence ‘You may bet on the truth of what I said’” 
(1868:503). 
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“intended to cause another to follow suit”. In order to clarify this point, consider 
a simple case. Suppose that Helen and Tim had the following exchange:  
  Helen. I need to get to work immediately, but I am low on gas.  
               Is the station around the corner on Cuba St open? 
   Tim.   You bet it’s open.  
It is clear that in uttering his reply, Tim is asserting that the gas station around 
the corner on Cuba St is open at the time of the utterance. By doing so, Tim is 
overtly endorsing this proposition and recommending Helen to use it in 
practical reasoning and action. Tim has acquired a responsibility in performing 
this kind of speech act because there are foreseeable negative consequences for 
Helen in case the proposition he asserted were false. Once she arrives at the gas 
station around the corner on Cuba St, Helen can easily evaluate whether Tim 
asserted correctly or incorrectly. Indeed, if the gas station on Cuba St were 
closed, Helen would be mad at Tim. 
As the above case illustrates, the overt endorsement of p on the part of 
speakers using “you bet that p” as a form of assertion generates in their listeners 
a disposition to practical reasoning and action.  When one uses “You bet that p”, 
one is thus liable for the inconveniences in case the proposition turns out to be 
false. In other words, one is responsible in virtue of using such expression as a 
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means to assert something. Of course, the speaker may have a valid excuse for 
incorrectly asserting a proposition. For example, suppose that the gas station in 
Cuba St was close because of a last-minute gas leak. Should Helen criticize Tim? 
Clearly not. In this sort of cases, it is clear that one should excuse the speaker.  
In sum, Peirce made two important points in the above passage. The first 
point is that using the expression “You bet” to make an assertion is similar to 
make a wager in that both acts presuppose that their performers will be 
accountable in case the proposition at stake turns out to be false. The second 
point is that if one asserts by means of using the expression “you bet”, one 
publicly endorses p and urges one’s listener to follow suit. This means that one 
entitles the listener to reassert that p, to assert any of its consequences, to believe 
that p and thus take p as basis for practical reason and action. Hence, Peirce 
concluded that using “you bet that p” is a form of solemn assertion in which the 
speaker undertakes a certain kind of responsibility.   
1.3.3. Case 3: Taking an oath 
Finally, I shall discuss a very important piece of textual evidence concerning 
Peirce’s account of assertion. In the following passage, Peirce examined a case of 
paradigmatic assertion, namely, taking an oath. He wrote:  
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Taking an oath is not mainly an event of the nature of a setting forth, 
Vorstellung, or representing. It is not mere saying, but is doing. The law, I 
believe, calls it an "act." At any rate, it would be followed by very real effects, 
in case the substance of what is asserted should be proved untrue. This 
ingredient, the assuming of responsibility, which is so prominent in solemn 
assertion, must be present in every genuine assertion. For clearly, every 
assertion involves an effort to make the intended interpreter believe what is 
asserted, to which end a reason for believing it must be furnished. (CP 5.546)  
Peirce opened this passage by drawing a distinction between saying and 
asserting. Let me begin to elaborate on this distinction by stating a platitude: 
when one performs an act of assertion by means of an utterance act, one is not 
merely mouthing words but rather saying something. For example, suppose that 
Helen assertorically utters the sentence “Joe is ugly”.  In doing so, she is saying 
something of Joe, namely, that he is unpleasant in appearance. Alternatively, one 
might gloss this point as follows: in assertorically uttering the sentence “Joe is 
ugly”, Helen is representing Joe as being a certain way, namely, unpleasant in 
appearance.16 Helen was able to do this by combining the predicative expression 
“is ugly” with the name “Joe”. Since asserting and saying are so intimately 
                                                             
16 I should note that the term “representing” here does not convey that a sentence has intrinsic 
representational properties. In Chapter 3, I will clarify this point by discussing Peirce’s view of 
the sign.   
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related, Peirce thought that a first step to clarify what it is that one is doing when 
one solemnly asserts a proposition is to differentiate asserting from saying.  
Let me elaborate further on the difference between asserting and saying 
according to Peirce.17Consider the assertoric use of different sentences of the 
same language by means of which one says the same thing. For example, suppose 
that a speaker utters the following sentences in suitable circumstances:  
(3) The spouse of Xanthippe was whiskered. 
(4) Socrates was bearded. 
It is clear that by means of uttering (3) and (4) the speaker has made two 
assertions but has said the same thing. Now, suppose that the speaker is 
proficient in Portuguese and he utters the following sentence: 
(5) Sócrates era barbudo. 
To be sure, one accepts that in uttering (3) and (4) the speaker has said the same 
thing as in (5). As these examples show, in performing the same speech act of 
assertion by using different sentences of the same or different languages, a 
speaker may say the same thing.  
                                                             
17 Peirce used the terms “saying” and “predicating” interchangeably. For simplicity, I will follow 
Peirce in this use. In Chapter 3, I will elaborate on Peirce’s use of the term “predicating”.  
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Hence, as the above cases show, asserting entails saying, but the converse 
does not hold 18. According to Peirce, one should not conflate saying with 
asserting. In (EP 2.312, 1904) Peirce made this point in terms of the distinction 
between what is said and its assertion or, alternatively, in terms of the distinction 
between a proposition and its assertion. He wrote: “the proposition in the 
sentence, “Socrates est sapiens”, strictly expressed, is “Socrates sapientem esse”. 
The defense of this position is that in this way we distinguish between a 
proposition and the assertion of it […].” Hilpinen interprets this passage as 
conveying something equivalent to Frege’s celebrated distinction between sense 
and force. He comments: 
A proposition is not an assertion, but rather a sign which is “capable of 
being asserted” (CP 2. 252), a potential of possible assertion, and the logical 
and semantic properties of propositions reflect this possibility. What is 
asserted (or uttered in an assertive speech act) is usually an indicative 
sentence; thus, according to Peirce, when a proposition is asserted or when 
it is considered as the content of an assertion, it can be regarded as 
“equivalent to as sentence in the indicative mood” (CP 2.315). The 
distinction between an assertion an a proposition (or “thought”) was 
                                                             
18 In Chapter 3, I will elaborate on the specific sense in which an act of saying is involved in an act 
of asserting. 
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explicitly made by Frege, even though he rejected (in his 1892 paper “Über 
Sinn und Bedeutung”) the view that different speech act types (e.g., 
assertions and commands) can have the same content. Hilpinen (1992:468) 
It is tempting to see a resemblance between Peirce’s distinction between a 
proposition and its assertion and Frege’s distinction between a proposition 
(Gedanke) expressed by a sentence and the assertoric force of such sentence or 
“behauptende Kraft”.19 However, the limitations of this comparison are 
perspicuous, for Frege and Peirce meant very different things by “assertion” and 
“proposition”. Accordingly, it seems to me that Peirce’s distinction resembles 
Frege’s only in a very general sense: both distinctions avoid conflating assertion, 
whatever assertion is, with what is said. To be sure, this is not a trivial point of 
agreement between Frege and Peirce.  
Unfortunately, Hilpinen does not elaborate on Peirce’s tricky example 
above, which is meant to illustrate his distinction. What Peirce tried to convey by 
this example? Although I do not claim that Peirce’s example is unequivocal, I 
will attempt to offer a plausible and adequate interpretation of it. Peirce said that 
the proposition in the sentence “Socrates est sapiens” is strictly expressed by the 
                                                             
19 See Frege (1984). This is also known as the “Frege-Geach point”, see Geach (1960). See also 
Dummett (1981).  
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sentence “Socrates sapientem esse”. Accordingly, the key of this example is to 
understand what Peirce meant by “strict expression”. 20  
The Latin sentence “Socrates est sapiens” is an indicative sentence while 
“Socrates sapientem esse” combines an accusative subject with an infinitive. The 
latter kind of sentence is used in Latin in indirect speech (i.e. as a subordinate 
clause after verbs like asserting) and thus is the grammatical equivalent of 
English that-clause complements.21  Thus, according to Peirce, one can “strictly 
express” the same proposition in two different languages by using the following 
expressions: 
        (6a) Socrates sapientem esse. 
        (6b) That Socrates is wise.  
Yet one cannot use (6a) and (6b) alone. Dependent clauses are not complete 
sentences. In English, for example, they are parts of sentences such as “Maria 
claimed that Socrates is wise”. Indeed, English assertive verbs take that-clause 
                                                             
20 I should make a caveat here. The current use of the phrase “expression of a proposition” is 
associated with a conception of propositions as abstract objects. It is widely accepted among 
contemporary philosophers that that-clauses denote propositions. In addition, those philosophers 
who endorse this view quantify over propositions and use the term “proposition” as a count 
noun. If one endorses the view that to quantify over something is to accept an ontological 
commitment to it, then it would seem that these expressions indicate the view that there are 
entities called propositions. Peirce was not committed to this conception of propositions. He 
thought that to conceive propositions as abstract objects is to detach the concept of proposition 
from its practical significance, which is equivalent to render it unintelligible; see (EP 2.312). I shall 
elaborate on these two points in Chapter 3.   
21 See Jones & Sidwell (1986:98). 
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complements, which are expressions of the form “that s”, where “s” is replaced 
by an indicative sentence, to compose sentences of the form “A asserts that-s”. 
Sentences exhibiting this form contain two parts. One is formed by a personal 
pronoun or name followed by an assertive verb (e.g. “I claim”). I shall call it 
“assertive clause”. The other part contains a that-clause complement (e.g. that 
Albert is funny). I shall call sentences of this form “explicit assertoric sentences” 
(e.g. “I claim that Albert is funny”) in contrast with assertions made by means of 
the utterance of sentences in the indicative mood (e.g. Maria utters the sentence 
“Albert is funny”).  
Now, considering the above points, Peirce’s example seems to convey that 
the distinction between a proposition and its assertion is mirrored by the 
structure of explicit assertoric sentences. In other words, the distinction between 
a proposition and its assertion has a grammatical counterpart: the distinction 
between a that-clause and an assertive clause. The assertive clause is the mark of 
an assertion in contradistinction with its complement or that-clause, which 
“strictly express” a proposition or what is said. 
An opponent of this interpretation might immediately reply that this 
“grammatical counterpart “is superfluous. One does not usually make assertoric 
utterances by means of explicit assertoric sentences. The usual way to make 
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assertions is by uttering indicative sentences. For example, to assert that Socrates 
is wise, one usually utters “Socrates is wise” rather than “I assert that Socrates is 
wise”. It is thus clear that although utterances of an indicative sentences do not 
contain assertive verbs, one usually understands them as a way to assert a 
proposition. Evidently, this is in accord with ordinary language use.  
However, the rationale of Peirce’s notion of strict expression does not 
concern ordinary language use. It concerns logical analysis: the notion of strict 
expression is a convenient way of making perspicuous the difference between 
the act of assertion and a proposition. By contrast, in uttering an indicative 
sentence there is no straightforward way of preventing the conflation of a 
proposition with its assertion.22 Consider an example from Peirce: “Nobody ever 
asserted [correctly] that the moon is made of green cheese; yet this is a familiar 
proposition” (MS 599: 5, ca. 1902). Following this example, suppose that Maria 
utters, “The moon is made of green cheese”. One might assume that she is joking. 
However, in using the predicative expression “is made of cheese” to convey that 
the moon is a composed of curd, or, alternatively, to represent it as being so, one 
                                                             
22 Notably, it seems that both Peirce and Frege noted the importance of not conflating assertion 
with predication. For Frege’s distinction, see Pfisterer (2010). For a discussion of this confusion in 
Aristotle, Scotus and Aquinas, see Pini (2004). This conflation is also present in ordinary 
language: “Proposition (noun): 1. A statement or assertion that expresses a judgment or opinion” 
Oxford English Dictionary.  
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has not necessarily asserted such thing. Indeed, if one asks whether the moon is 
made of cheese, one is thereby representing the moon as being so but one is not 
also asserting it.  
Hence, although asserting involves saying, the structure of assertoric 
sentences differentiates saying from asserting. As such, if one uses an indicative 
sentence as a means to assert what one is saying, one might transform it into an 
explicit assertoric sentence. In Peirce’s own words: “That this is so is shown by the 
precise equivalence between any verb in the indicative and the same made the object of 
‘I tell you’: ‘Jesus wept’ = ‘I tell you that Jesus wept’” (EP 2.478). 
I am now in a position to return to (CP 5.546). Granting Peirce’s distinction 
between a proposition and its assertion, one might formulate Peirce’s question in 
this passage as follows: What a speaker is doing in relation to a proposition when 
performing an oath? I shall introduce Peirce’s answer to this question by way of 
a particular example. Suppose that Louie’s lawyer called Helen as a witness. 
While she was on the stand, the judge reminded her that she was under oath. 
Then, she testified that Louie was jogging with her when the murder took place. 
What exactly the judge reminded Helen before she testified? The answer to this 
question is straightforward: that by taking an oath she undertook an overt 
responsibility for the proposition she was going to assert. In other words, Helen’s 
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normative status changed in virtue of taking an oath, for she acquired a 
responsibility for the truth of the proposition she asserted. 
Why Helen’s normative status changed? In (CP 5.546), Peirce remarked 
that “every assertion involves an effort to make the intended interpreter believe 
what is asserted”. If speakers urge listeners (or interpreters) to believe that p by 
means of asserting that p, then they are recommending their listeners to take p as 
basis for practical reason and action. For example, Louie may be acquitted 
because the judged believed what Helen asserted. But consider that if the judge 
were to find out that what Helen asserted is false, he would realize that he 
wrongly acquitted Louie. In other words, had Helen asserted a false proposition, 
she would have cause terrible harm. This is the reason why penalties ensue from 
perjury. 
Of course, the prosecutor of the case may challenge Helen’s assertion. For 
example, he may ask what the nature of her relationship with Louie is, how she 
is recovering of the knee surgery she had a month ago, etc. At this point Peirce’s 
qualification regarding the term “responsibility for truth” cashes out: asserters 
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ought to give reasons for the propositions they assert. Otherwise, listeners would 
not believe what they assert.23  
Let me expand on this point. What is it to take responsibility for the truth 
of a proposition? This question is not trivial, for it is clear that one plays no role 
in the truth of a proposition. Accordingly, Peirce glossed “responsibility for the 
truth of a proposition” as “a duty to give reasons for a proposition”. In other 
words, to commit oneself to the truth of a proposition is to commit oneself to do 
something, namely to defend what one says by giving reasons for it upon 
challenge. There is no need here to appeal to a stronger case of assertion. Indeed, 
in uttering “The cat is on the sofa”, you are committed to defend what you 
asserted. If your addressee asks you, “How do you know?” you may adequately 
reply, “I have just seen the cat” or “Come here and look!” As this example shows, 
Peirce thought that one is responsible for the truth of a proposition in the sense 
that one acquires the duty to defend or vindicate such proposition within 
reasoned discourse.  
Let me return to the case at issue. Once it is clear that the responsibility for 
the truth of a proposition consists in giving reasons for that proposition, it 
becomes clear that in taking an oath one is thereby accountable if either what one 
                                                             
23 In Chapter 4, I will elaborate on the meaning of “giving reasons” and the interpersonal aspect 
of assertion. 
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says is false or one is not in a position to defend what one says. Thus, taking an 
oath is an act by which one undertakes an overt responsibility for the truth of a 
proposition.   
 
1.4. The outcome of Peirce’s inspection 
The textual evidence suggests that Peirce’s account of assertion can be 
reconstructed in the form of the following argument: it is plausible to assume 
that ordinary assertions sufficiently resemble solemn assertions. Now, by 
inspecting paradigmatic cases of assertion, one can establish that asserters are 
not mere sayers but doers, for they publicly endorse propositions and urge them 
upon their addreseess. Assertions are actions with clear consequences for 
linguistic communication. As such, asserters are agents and in that capacity they 
ough to be accountable for their actions. Thus, if a speaker S solemnly asserts a 
propostion p, then S undertakes an overt responsibility for the truth of p. Here 
“responsibility for truth” means “a responsibility to give reasons”. Therefore, 
whenever S asserts that p, S is thereby responsible to give reasons for p. For 
example, suppose that a friend of yours asserts that for every natural number n, 
the product of n and zero is equal to zero. In doing so, she urges you to believe 
what she said and thus entitles you to reassert it, to assert any of its 
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consequences (e.g., that 7 x 0 = 0), and, for that matter, to use it in the course of 
proving related theorems. If you ask her “How do you know?” she may point 
out that it follows directly from the laws of arithmetic. If you reply, “I do not see 
it!” she may defer to the teacher for an elaborate answer, or she may attempt to 
offer a proof.  
I shall make two qualifications regarding Peirce’s argument. First, one 
might object that Peirce’s argument cannot provide conclusive proof that 
speakers change their normative statuses by undertaking a certain kind of 
responsibility in virtue of asserting a proposition. In reply, one should note that 
Peirce’s inspection does not intend to offer such conclusive proof. The 
argumentative scope of Peirce’s inspection is moderate. It simply intends to 
establish the plausibility of the idea that speakers undertake an overt 
responsibility for the truth of a proposition in virtue of performing an act of 
assertion. 
Second, the reconstructed argument accounts only for the claim that 
asserting has a normative effect on the speaker and not for the claim that this 
effect is the feature that characterizes assertion. In this respect, Chauiviré (1979) 
claims that Peirce’s view of assertion is a good example of how he used his 
principle of pragmatism. The principle of pragmatism says that one should 
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analyze concepts in terms of its conceivable practical effects (EP 1:132; W 3:266, 
1878; EP 2.346, 1905). However, one should note, on the one hand, that Peirce 
did not explicitly acknowledge the use of the principle of pragmatism in his 
account of assertion or, at least, Peirce was not clear in this respect. It seems less 
demanding to assume that Peirce thought that the above argument provides 
good reasons to characterize assertion in term of its normative effect on the 
speaker.  
Thus, either Peirce thought that the above argument provides good 
reasons to take the responsibility for truth on the part of the speaker as what 
qualifies assertion as a speech act or he used the principle of pragmatism as a 
tacit methodological principle.24 Either way, following (CP 5.543), I shall 
reformulate Peirce’s view of assertion as follows: one asserts that p if and only if 
one undertakes the responsibility to vindicate p. 
 
1.5. Final remarks 
In this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct and assess Peirce’s inspection of 
three paradigmatic cases of assertion. By reconstructing and evaluating Peirce’s 
                                                             
24 I shall not dicuss here the import of this principle. For Peirce’s several formulations of the 
principle of pragmatism and the place of this principle in Peirce’s philosophy see Hookway (2004; 
2012) and Burke (2013).  
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inspection, it has become clear that Peirce had good reasons to understand the 
speech act of assertion in terms of its normative effect on the speaker.  
According to Peirce, performing an assertion changes the normative status 
of speakers. This change consists in the acquisition of a commitment on the part 
of speakers to the truth of what they say. Peirce called this change the “real 
effect” of assertion. In turn, speakers ought to honor their commitments by 
giving reasons for the propositions they assert.  
Hence, in asserting that p, the speaker endorses p and urges the listener to 
follow suit. The speaker thereby entitles the listener to assert that p, to assert any 
of its consequences, to believe that p and thus take p as basis for practical reason 
and action. Since asserting a proposition has consequences for linguistic 
communication, one says that a speaker is answerable for his assertions. Hence, 
according to Peirce, a speaker S asserts that p if and only if S takes responsibility 
for the truth of p.  
I would like to remark that although Peirce did not intend to offer 
something like a proof that the picture of assertion delivered by his account is 
correct, he did intend to show how to understand assertive acts based on the 
simple idea that they have a characteristic normative effect on communication.  
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Where one should go from here in trying to understand further Peirce’s 
view of assertion? There are three important aspects involved in Peirce’s view of 
assertion, as I reformulated it above, that are worth exploring, namely:  
(i) Assertion as an act that involves the undertaking of a certain 
responsibility.  
(ii) What is asserted as propositions. 
(iii) Responsibility for truth as a vindicatory commitment.  
In the next three chapters, I shall elaborate on these three aspects of Peirce’s view 
of assertion respectively.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Assertion and Responsibility 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The outcome of Peirce’s inspection of paradigmatic cases of assertion is that 
speakers who perform acts of assertion undertake an overt responsibility for the 
truth of a proposition. In this chapter, I address the following question:  How 
Peirce understood the nature of the responsibility involved in assertion? This 
question concerns the nature of assertion as an act involving a certain kind of 
responsibility or, in other words, the nature of assertion as the state or condition 
of being responsible for the truth of a proposition. 
In section 2.2., I will introduce two interpretations of Peirce’s view 
concerning the meaning of “being responsible” for the truth of a proposition, 
namely, the conventional interpretation and the moral interpretation. In section 
2.3., I will argue for a moral interpretation by showing that Peirce held asserters 
as moral agents. In section 2.4., I will make some relevant qualifications 
concerning the moral interpretation.  
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2.2. Being responsible in virtue of asserting: Two interpretations 
There are at least two interpretations of Peirce’s view concerning the nature of 
assertion as the condition of being responsible for the truth of a proposition. I 
shall call them the “conventional interpretation” and the “moral interpretation”, 
respectively. 25  The former interpretation says that one is responsible in virtue of 
performing an act of assertion because such act is considered either acceptable or 
unacceptable to most members of a society. The latter interpretation says that one 
is responsible in virtue of performing an act of assertion because asserters are 
moral agents.  
Let me offer a clearer picture of the issue that both the conventional and 
the moral interpretation attempt to resolve. Peirce argued that to assert a 
proposition p is to make oneself responsible for p. By “making oneself 
responsible”, one usually means “making oneself responsible to do something”. 
For example, I can make myself responsible for the well-being of my brother’s 
dog while he vacations by uttering, “I will take care of Fido while you are in 
Maceió”. It is clear that in uttering such sentence, I have made a promise. In turn, 
it is clear that in virtue of making such promise I have acquired the duty to feed, 
                                                             
25 For a broader distinction between moral and conventional normativity see Reinach (1912/1913). 
For a specific discussion of this distinction as applied to speech, see Cuneo (2014).  
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walk, and bath Fido. Suppose that I forget to feed Fido and, as a result, the dog 
died of starvation. To be sure, I am accountable for the ensuing harm I have 
caused, namely, the death of Fido and the sorrow of my brother. I deserve blame 
because I failed to meet my duty. Thus, it is arguably uncontroversial to say that 
one undertakes a moral responsibility in virtue of promising. By contrast, 
suppose now that I utter “Two plus two equals four”. It is clear that in uttering 
such sentence, I have made an assertion. Thus, according to Peirce, I have 
undertaken a responsibility for the truth of the proposition that two plus two 
equals four. However, it is not clear in which sense I am responsible in virtue of 
making such assertion. 26 This is the issue that the conventional and the moral 
interpretations attempt to resolve.  
Both interpretations take as starting point Peirce’s view that speakers are 
responsible in virtue of performing an act of assertion. The point of disagreement 
between these interpretations concerns the nature of the responsibility involved 
in asserting.  
Let me introduce the nature of such disagreement. The conventional 
interpretation construes the claim that asserters are responsible for the truth of a 
proposition as a socio-linguistic observation. Accordingly, asserters put forward 
                                                             
26 See Watson (2004) for a detailed comparison between asserting and promising in respect to 
moral responsibility. 
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their bona fides, so to speak, and are subject to social criticism if either what they 
say turns out false or they are not able to defend what they say. Since the speaker 
who asserts a false proposition or is not able to defend it is subject to social 
criticism, the conventional interpretation holds that the social relation between 
speaker and addressee changes because of the speaker’s act of assertion. Thus, it 
is plausible to claim that the addressee will hold the speaker accountable and 
that the speaker acknowledges such accountability. However, since the 
responsibility involved in asserting is a mere socio-linguistic effect on the 
speaker based on pure convention it does not follow that the speaker is 
responsible in any moral sense.  
The conventional interpretation is suggested by Pagin (2015:20), who 
reads (CP 5.546) as follows: 
Firstly, as a matter of socio-linguistic observation, speakers in fact in some 
sense take responsibility for, or commit themselves to, being right in what 
they say. The speaker puts her cognitive authority behind it, so to speak, and 
has to suffer some measure of social humiliation if what she says turns out 
false. Secondly, there is the further idea that the commitment is made to the 
addressee or the hearers in general. The speaker who makes an incorrect 
assertion opens himself to criticism by his addressee, perhaps for misleading 
him, in a way similar to a subject who fails to live up to a promise. In this 
57 
 
 
respect, the social relation between speaker and addressee has changed 
because of the assertion. Typically, the addressee will hold the speaker 
accountable for the correctness of the assertion, and the speaker accepts to be 
held so accountable. This is again a socio-linguistic observation: it does not 
follow that the speaker actually is accountable.  
Pagin’s interpretation of what Peirce said in (CP 5.546) is that asserters are not 
morally accountable for what they assert. If a speaker asserts a proposition and 
such proposition turns out false, the speaker merely suffers “social humiliation”. 
For Pagin, although listeners hold speakers accountable and speakers accept to be 
held accountable, it does not follow that speakers are accountable. This is an 
indirect way to say that speakers are not morally accountable. Pagin holds that 
Peirce’s view construes the speaker as accountable only in accordance with a 
social convention, namely, that speakers are customarily censured when they 
assert false propositions or are not able to defend the propositions they assert.  
Pagin does not elaborate further on this interpretation. However, his point 
is moderately clear: For Pagin, asserters are like orchestra musicians. Consider a 
renowned orchestra playing Boléro. Bob, who interprets the sopranino 
saxophone, is unprepared. Still he goes on to perform and makes a big mistake. 
As a result, he suffers social humiliation and censure. His colleagues and his 
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audience hold him accountable for ruining the orchestra’s performance and he 
accepts to be held so accountable. However, it is clear that he would not be 
accountable beyond certain social conventions. As this analogy illustrates, the 
conventional interpretation offers a socio-linguistic picture of the responsibility 
involved in assertion in which “responsibility” conveys a mere behavioral by-
product of social interaction that has no moral repercussions. 
I turn now to the moral interpretation. According to this interpretation, 
Peirce construed the responsibility involved in assertion as a moral 
responsibility.27 This means that speakers are morally responsible for the truth of 
what they say in virtue of performing an act of assertion.28 Here the relevant 
sense of “moral responsibility” concerns openness to moral evaluations for one’s 
actions. Such responsibility is not bound to conventions or to the speaker’s choice 
to accept it. In this sense, to be morally responsible for an act is to be answerable 
for one’s action and for any harm caused by one’s action. These actions are also 
social, for they occur in the context of interpersonal relationships (e.g. between 
                                                             
27 For a clear exposition and discussion of moral responsibility, see Clarke, McKenna & Smith 
(2015); see also Vargas (2013) and cf. Waller (2011), who argues against moral responsibility.    
28 Of course, there are different interpretations of the term “normative” not involving moral 
responsibility. This interpretation involves moral normativity since, as it will be patent in the 
textual evidence, Peirce thought that asserters are moral agents.  
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colleagues, friends, family members, etc.). In our case, the interpersonal relation 
at stake is that between speakers (or asserters) and listeners (or addressees).  
This interpretation is suggested but not developed by K.O. Apel in his 
remarks concerning Peirce’s view of assertion in (CP 5.546). He wrote:  
Peirce further develops this point of view [i.e. that to assert is to commit 
oneself to the truth of a proposition] by means of linguistic analysis, first in 
his 1903 lecture on Pragmatism (5.29ff.) and then, most of all, in a fragment 
from 1908 (5.546-47). Ceremonious statements that explicitly take 
responsibility for their content, such as an oath before a court, merely 
make visible, as through a magnifying glass, the willful, morally relevant, 
active aspect that is inherent in every assertion […]. Not just the oath as a 
legal act, but every assertion that implicitly claims truth is an action by 
which the one making the assertion enters into reality in a causal, dynamic 
way and becomes engaged morally in the communication community. 
Apel (1981:163) 
According to Apel, Peirce thought that the “moral engagement” of asserters in 
the communication community grants them moral responsibility in virtue of 
performing acts of assertion. In other words, speakers become moral agents 
when they engage in assertoric speech. As such, their assertions can be evaluated 
as correct or incorrect and speakers ought to take moral responsibility for their 
60 
 
 
assertions as any moral agent ought to do. Thus, the moral interpretation claims 
that Peirce was committed to the view that asserters are moral agents and, 
consequently, they are morally responsible in virtue of performing acts of 
assertion. In addition, addressees attribute moral responsibility to asserters for 
their acts of assertion.  
 
2.3. Peirce on “Being responsible” 
In this section, I will argue for a moral interpretation of Peirce’s view of assertoric 
responsibility. Now, it is clear that if Peirce held that asserters are moral agents, 
then asserters are morally responsible for the truth of the propositions they 
assert. Accordingly, in order to argue that Peirce construed the responsibility 
involved in asserting as a moral responsibility, it will suffice to show that Peirce 
held that asserters are moral agents. And this is exactly what I will do in the 
sequel. 29  
Let me begin by fulfilling an obvious requirement of the above argument. 
In trying to show that Peirce took asserters as moral agents, one requires a 
criterion to identify a moral agent. I propose the following criterion: one is a 
moral agent in virtue of performing an act x if and only if one performs x and x 
                                                             
29 One should note that Peirce did not elaborate on his view about moral responsibility.  
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has the potential to change one’s moral status.30 By “moral status”, I simply mean 
the status acquired by those who meet or fail to meet their moral obligations. In 
the present case, the relevant moral status is blame, which results from failing to 
meet one’s moral obligation. Here I follow (CP 1.666). This passage contains 
Peirce’s single known remark on the import of the term “morality”: “Now what's 
the use of prying into the philosophical basis of morality? We all know what 
morality is: it is behaving as you were brought up to behave, that is, to think you 
ought to be punished for not behaving.” Of course, it makes no sense to say that 
one is punishable if one is not blamable. The root of the idea that asserters are 
blamable is the general assumption that the kind of acts for which agents are 
blamable are those acts by means of which they freely and willfully generate 
changes in a certain situation. Thus, if Peirce thought that a speaker who asserts a 
proposition is punishable (and thus blamable), in virtue of performing an act of 
assertion, then he was committed to the view that asserters are moral agents.  
I turn now to an examination of two pieces of textual evidence supporting 
the claim that Peirce thought that speakers who assert a proposition are blamable 
and punishable. The first piece of evidence is present in (CP 5.546). Peirce wrote: 
                                                             
30 For a philosophical exploration of the concept of moral status, see Warren (1999).  
62 
 
 
But if a lie would not endanger the esteem in which the utterer was held, 
nor otherwise be apt to entail such real effects as he [the interpreter] could 
avoid, the interpreter would have no reason to believe the assertion. 
Nobody takes any positive stock in those conventional utterances, such as 
"I am perfectly delighted to see you," upon whose falsehood no 
punishment at all is visited.  
According to Peirce, asserting a false proposition puts at risk the praise of the 
speaker. Why? When a speaker asserts a proposition, he is endorsing it and 
urging it upon his addressee. Usually, the addressee comes to assent to the 
proposition and to believe it. Since believing a proposition is related to reasoning 
and action, believing a false proposition can endanger the addressee. And it is 
clear that the addressee understands the difference between believing a true 
proposition and believing a false one. For example, suppose that a child is above 
to take a geography test. The child asks to her father, “Which is the longest river 
in Brazil?” The father replies “The Paraná River”. Evidently, the assertion of the 
father changes the doxastic situation of the child. A couple of days passed and 
the results of the test arrived. Clearly disappointed, the child criticizes her father, 
who apologizes and compensates her with an ice cream. As this example shows, 
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it seems that one would judge that the father deserved the criticism of his child. 
Asserters are punishable for changing the doxastic situation of their addressees.  
Now, for the sake of argument, suppose with Peirce that asserters were 
not punishable for “the real effects” that addressees could avoid for believing 
false propositions. It follows that addressees would not understand the 
difference between believing a true proposition and believing a false one. This 
claim has absurd consequences for cognition and action. For example, 
mathematicians would not tell the difference between a sound and unsound 
proof, postal workers would not tell the difference between right and wrong 
directions, judges would not tell the difference between sending guilty and 
innocent people to jail, and, as Peirce mentioned, people would not tell the 
difference between conventional utterances used to greet people and assertoric 
utterances, etc. Thus, according to Peirce, asserters are punishable. Since Peirce 
thought that asserters are punishable, it follows that Peirce was committed to the 
view that asserters are blamable.31 
The second piece of textual evidence I would like to discuss is present in 
an unpublished manuscript from 1903. Peirce wrote:  
                                                             
31 It is interesting to note that some recent work on moral responsibility also hinges on the idea of 
potential blame. For example, Darwall (2006) holds that to be a moral agent is to be subject to 
moral obligations, which just is to be blameable. 
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 […] an act of assertion supposes that, a proposition being formulated, a 
person performs an act which renders him liable to the penalties of social 
law (or, at any rate, those of moral law) in case it should not be true, unless 
he has a definite and sufficient excuse; […]. (EP 2.278) 
In this passage, Peirce claims that one is liable to social and moral penalties if one 
asserts a false proposition. It is clear that he emphasized in the moral element 
involved in asserting. However, it is not clear what exactly he meant by “moral 
law” in this context. If one assumes he was using this term in its ordinary sense, 
then he meant by “moral law” a principle defining the criteria of correct action. 
Unfortunately, he did not mention which is this principle. Accordingly, it would 
be more productive to tackle the following question: What is the driving thought 
behind Peirce’s emphasis on the moral dimension of assertion?  
If one is liable to moral penalties in virtue of asserting a false proposition, 
it is clear that asserting a proposition is an act that has the potential to change the 
moral status of the speaker. In other words, in asserting a false proposition, a 
speaker moves from praise to blame. Thus, asserters are suitable candidates for 
blamable agents. For example, suppose that someone asks you “Where is the 
cat?” and you reply, “The cat is on the sofa”. According to Peirce, by asserting 
the proposition that the cat is on the sofa, you have both embraced it yourself 
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and urged it upon your addressee, who is thereby entitled to reassert it and, for 
that matter, to assert any of its consequences (e.g., that the cat is in the house).32 
Suppose now that at the time of your reply you did not check that the cat was 
indeed on the sofa and it turns out that the cat left the house and got lost. It is 
clear that you could have done things otherwise. It is also clear that making one’s 
addressee believe a false proposition because of one’s act of assertion can cause 
harm. Thus, you are liable to moral penalties for asserting a false proposition and 
you are certainly blamable for doing so. In other words, if one is liable to moral 
penalties in case the proposition one asserted is false, then performing acts of 
assertion involves that the asserter is blamable.  
At this point, Peirce’s remark concerning a “sufficient excuse” calls for 
attention. One should note that moral liability belongs to persons only regarding 
their failure to honor their obligations. In other words, holding someone morally 
liable seems to be a matter of placing moral blame on him or her, possibly 
accompanied by punishment for the misdeed. The justification for the 
punishment is that the person who is to be punished is morally blameworthy 
(e.g., I am to be punished because I am blameworthy for asserting a false 
                                                             
32 Although Peirce hinted at the distinction between direct and indirect commitments, he did not 
explicitly introduce it. I will explain this distinction in Chapter 5. For this distinction, see Rescher 
(1968) and (Brandom (1994).   
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proposition). However, Peirce pointed out that that from the claim that one is 
blamable does not necessarily follows that one is liable to moral penalties. If one 
is blamable and one has failed to meet one’s obligation but has a valid excuse, 
one does not deserve punishment. Let me return to the child’s geography test. 
Suppose that it is revealed that the father had a minor stroke the morning he 
drove his child to school. If this were the case, the father would not deserve 
criticism. 
In normal cases, the penalties ensuing from an incorrect assertion are 
vague, but not to the point of being unnamed. In (EP 2.312), Peirce wrote: “[…] 
the only difference between swearing to a proposition and an ordinary 
affirmation of it, such as logic contemplates, is that in the latter case the penalties 
are less and even less certain than those of the law”. Although it might not be a 
severe penalty, being subject to explicit criticism, censure and discredit in virtue 
of asserting a false proposition seems enough punishment for an ordinary 
person. Thus, according to Peirce, asserters are blamable and deserve 
punishment unless they have a sufficient excuse.  
In sum, in the textual evidence just discussed, Peirce argued that if one’s 
addressee is entitled to use the proposition one asserted in practical reasoning 
and action, one’s moral status changes in virtue of performing acts of assertion. 
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Assertions are acts by means of which one freely and purposively changes the 
doxastic status of the addressee. Thus, asserting a false proposition can cause 
harm to one’s addressee. Peirce thought that this aspect of asserting is the one in 
virtue of which asserters are punishable or liable to moral penalties. Thus, Peirce 
was committed to the view that asserters are blamable.   
Since Peirce thought that asserters are blamable, it becomes clear that 
Peirce thought that asserters are agents whose moral status changes in virtue of 
performing an act of assertion. Therefore, asserters are moral agents. In turn, 
since moral agency implies moral responsibility, it follows that Peirce was 
committed to the claim that asserters are morally responsible for the truth of the 
propositions they assert.  
One consequence of this interpretation is that addressees are entitled to 
hold asserters morally responsible for the truth of the propositions they assert. 
Indeed, Peirce is taking into account that assertions can be evaluated as correct or 
incorrect. Listeners are permitted to criticize speakers if either the propositions 
they assert are false or they fail to give reasons for such propositions upon 
challenge. However, this is not an evaluation of an agent’s action in terms of a 
failure to meet a social convention, but one related to the moral dimension of 
communication.  
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So far, I have argued for the moral interpretation of Peirce’s view of the 
responsibility involved in assertion. This interpretation might be summarized in 
two points. First, moral responsibility for the truth of a proposition is attributed 
to speakers as moral agents in virtue of their acts of assertion. Second, moral 
responsibility concerns the accountability that speakers might bear because they 
have failed to fulfill their obligation as asserters.33   
Since the discussion of the above textual evidence lends plausibility to the 
moral interpretation of Peirce’s view of the responsibility involved in assertion, I 
shall rephrase Peirce’s view of assertion as follows: one asserts that p if and only 
if one is morally responsible to vindicate p.  
 
2.4. Final remarks 
I would like to end this chapter by qualifying that I am not claiming that Peirce 
was unambiguous on his view of the responsibility involved in assertion. I am 
claiming that the textual evidence makes the claim that he endorsed the moral 
interpretation highly plausible.  
Although Peirce took moral responsibility as qualifying the characteristic 
effect of assertion, he never introduced his view on moral responsibility. 
                                                             
33 The responsibility of speakers, as a vindicatory commitment, is the subject matter of Chapter 4.  
69 
 
 
Accordingly, I have said nothing about Peirce’s view of morality. This is certainly 
problematic, but it would be more problematic to attribute to Peirce a view he 
did not endorse. For example, it seems plausible to claim that Peirce was a moral 
consequentialist. Moral consequentialism is the view that moral correctness of 
acts is determined by their consequences. Under this view, whether an act is 
morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something 
related to that act, such as a general rule binding acts of the same kind. 
Nevertheless, I have not found any textual evidence supporting the claim that 
Peirce was a moral consequentialist.  
In addition, Peirce did not elaborate on his view of normativity. He 
famously held that reasoning is a kind of action, and much of his philosophy is 
committed to the project of discerning the marks of good and responsible 
reasoning. In fact, Peirce claimed that logic is a “normative science” in the sense 
that it is “the doctrine of what we ought to think” and, thus, “an application of 
the doctrine of what we deliberately choose to do, which is Ethics” (EP 2.142). 
Moreover, in a text from 1904, Peirce claims that "Thinking is a kind of action, 
and reasoning is a kind of deliberate action; and to call an argument illogical, or a 
proposition false, is a special kind of moral judgment" (CP 8.91). But Peirce’s 
view of normativity is still a topic in need of research among Peirce scholars. 
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Accordingly, I shall not attempt to advance any position on these delicate 
matters here.  
However, I should note that even in the absence of an elaborate view of 
morality and normativity, Peirce’s view of the responsibility involved in 
assertion as a kind of moral responsibility employs minimal assumptions. These 
are that asserters are agents, that someone is a moral agent if his moral status 
changes in virtue of the actions they perform, and that if asserters are moral 
agents, then the responsibility involved in asserting is a moral responsibility.34 
These assumptions seem enough to lend plausibility to Peirce’s moral view of the 
responsibility of assertion.  
Finally, it is worth to mention en passant that one can develop Peirce’s 
cogent idea of understanding assertion in normative terms in a non-moral way. 
For example, proponents of the “rule-based” view of assertion defend that what 
qualifies a speech act as an assertion is its constitutive rule, say,  
     KNOWLEDGE RULE. One must assert that p only if one knows that p. 35   
                                                             
34 As Watson (2004:60) remarks: “Assertion seems to me an instructive paradigm for contexts of 
responsible agency that are of more obvious and direct ethical interest. It is instructive not only as 
an instance of taking responsibility, but also, I suspect, because there is something assertion-like 
at the core of the ethically central cases. Responsible agency requires that one stand for 
something, and this is something more basic than the subjection to substantive moral 
requirements.” 
35 For a rule-based account of assertion, see Williamson (1996), Williamson (2000; Ch.11), and 
Goldberg (2015). For a discussion of this account of assertion, see Brown & Capellen (2011).  
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The main difference between the commitment view and the rule-based view is 
that the former focuses on the normative effects of making assertions on speakers 
while the latter focuses on the rules for making assertions speakers ought to 
follow.  
Yet it is easy to see why Peirce’s view of assertion, conceived as the 
undertaking of a commitment, is bound by a rule to which asserters ought to 
comply:  
        ASSERTION RULE. One must assert that p only if one is in a position to give 
                                       reasons for p.36  
One should note, though, that an advantage of the commitment account over the 
rule-based view is that it offers a direct description of what is to make an 
assertion while the ruled-base account just specifies the norms for making an 
assertion.37  
I shall make clear that I have not intended to make here a comparison 
between Peirce’s view of assertion and rule-views of assertion. I have only 
pointed out, for the sake of comprehensiveness, that Peirce’s understanding of 
                                                             
36 Watson (2004) has remarked that this rule is too strong. For a response to this claim See 
MacFarlane (2011); see also Marion (2012).   
37 For the advantages of the commitment view of assertion over the rule-based view of assertion, 
see MacFarlane (2011). For a recent attempt to supplement the rule-based view, see Turri (2015). 
The two views could be combined. For example, see Watson (2004). 
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assertion in terms of moral responsibility is just one of the several forms that a 
normative understanding of assertion may take. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Assertion and Propositions 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Suppose that Helen assertorically utters the sentence “Tom Jobim wrote Águas de 
Março”. In doing so, she is committing herself to give reasons for what she said. 
Peirce identified the familiar notion of what is said with the notion of proposition. 
But, what exactly Peirce meant by the word “proposition”? In this chapter, I aim 
to elaborate on Peirce’s view of the proposition as “a sign capable of being 
asserted” (CP 8.837, 1904). In particular, I will argue that propositions are 
assertable signs in the sense that their criteria of identity depends on the 
possibility of its assertion.  
Accordingly, in section 3.2., I will discuss what Peirce meant by the claim 
that a proposition is a kind of sign. In particular, since Peirce construed the term 
“sign” as a triadic relation, I will show that a clear understanding of Peirce’s 
view of propositions involves three constitutive aspects, namely, propositions as 
sign-vehicles, propositions as being about something that is signified, and 
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propositions as signifying elements. Accordingly, in section 3.3., I will show that 
Peirce held a view of propositions as act-types. The main thrust of this view is 
that if one performs a speech act, one thereby instantiates an act of saying. In 
section 3.4., I will briefly discuss Peirce’s view concerning how it is possible for 
speakers to say something about something or someone by instantiating 
propositions. Finally, in section 3.5., I will discuss Peirce’s view of the relation 
between propositions and assertability.  
 
3.2. Propositions as signs 
Peirce thought that a proposition is an assertable sign. What Peirce meant by the 
word “sign”? He wrote:      
I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the 
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is 
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, 
called its Interpretant or Interpretand. (EP 2.477, 1906) 38 
Peirce developed the notion of sign in terms of its crucial function as a means to 
convey information in interpersonal acts of communication. He called such acts 
                                                             
38 From this notion of sign, Peirce developed a fruitful and complex theory of linguistic and non-
linguistic signs. The literature on Peirce’s semiotics is vast. Notable works are Randsdell (1977), 
Savan (1988), Liszka (1996), and Short (2007). I shall focus here only in linguistic signs, in 
particular the use of indicative sentences in assertoric speech. 
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of communication “semiosis”: “an act, or influence, which is, or involves, a 
cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object and its interpretant, this 
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into acts between pairs" (CP 
5.484). According to Peirce, sign users employ signs in acts of communication to 
convey certain characteristics or features of objects by means of the application of 
predicates. He wrote:  
That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the 
Interpretant is a Form. […] The Form that is communicated does not 
necessarily cease to be in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing, 
because its being is a being of the predicate. (MS 793) 
Peirce made an important point here: acts of communication are propositional 
acts, as it were, because one conveys through such acts a feature of an object by 
means of the application of predicates. Indeed, by the expression “being of a 
predicate”, Peirce meant here the essential role of predicates as applicable to 
objects.39 
As such, the key element of the semiosis is the sign, which has three 
irreducible aspects or elements: the sign itself or sign-vehicle, which is the sign’s 
physical form such as a sound, a printed word, or an image, etc.; the object, which 
                                                             
39 In the next section, I will explain in which exact sense Peirce thought that predicates are 
applicable to objects.  
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is what is signified by the sign-vehicle; and the interpretant, which is what the sign 
signifies. Peirce’s point is that a sign-vehicle is about some object because it is 
subsequently interpreted as a sign of that object. This subsequent interpretation 
is roughly what Peirce meant by “interpretant”. 
Let me introduce Peirce’s view of the sign as stated above by way of a 
simple example. Consider a paper map of Brazil. The map is a sign-vehicle of its 
object, the country of Brazil, and its interpretant is the information it conveys 
about the position and spatial relations of Brazil in respect to other countries (e.g. 
Brazil shares a land border with Colombia to the northwest), and the positions 
and spatial relations between its cities (e.g. São Paulo is in southeastern Brazil).40 
A map of Brazil is a sign in the sense that one interprets it as a sign of Brazil. 
The innovative aspect of Peirce’s view of the sign is that the sign-vehicle, 
the object and the interpretant stand in a special relationship to one another, 
which is a three-place or triadic relation. For Peirce, a sign is an irreducible 
triadic relation of the form “x is a sign of y to z”.41 Let me briefly elaborate on the 
relata of the sign relation by way of an example.  
                                                             
40 Peirce held the view that maps involve predication as languages do. See Rescorla (2009b) for an 
argument against this view and Casati & Varzi (1999) for an argument supporting it.  
41 It is worth to mention that Peirce’s so-called “Reduction Thesis” is the thesis that all relations, 
relations of arbitrary adicity, may be constructed from triadic relations alone. For Peirce, the 
paradigm case of a triadic relation is the sign relation. Burch (1991) offers an exposition and proof 
of Peirce's Reduction Thesis. 
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Suppose that Helen and Joe are having a conversation about ancient Greek 
philosophers. She assertorically utters the sentence “Socrates was bearded”. 
Which is the sign-vehicle in this case? The principal feature of the sign-vehicle is 
its function as a sign-vehicle, the physical form of a sign. Thus, in our example, 
Helen’s utterance of the sentence “Socrates was bearded” is the first relatum of 
the sign relation. 
As I have mentioned, Peirce thought that sign-vehicles are signs of objects. 
The context of Helen’s utterance indicates that it is about Socrates, the celebrated 
Athenian philosopher, who is thus the second relatum of the sign relation under 
analysis. Here the relevant sense of “aboutness” is a familiar one. For example, 
pictures are of people, the present text concerns Peirce’s view of assertion, maps 
are of cities, etc. In the context of semiosis, the predicate “is about” expresses the 
relation that sign-vehicles, such as the assertoric use of a sentence, bear to 
whatever it is that they are of or concern in virtue of being used for the purposes 
of communication.  
In addition, Peirce thought that the relationship between the object of a 
sign and the sign that signifies it is one of determination: “A Sign is a Cognizable 
that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e., specialized, bestimmt) by something other 
than itself, called its Object […]” (EP 2.492, 1909. Letter to W. James). This means that 
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the object imposes certain constrains that a sign must fall within if it is to signify 
that object. For example, indicative sentences have a logical syntax.42 The 
sentence “Socrates was bearded” has a logical subject, which is the name 
“Socrates”, and a logical predicate, which is the expression “was bearded” in 
order to characterize Socrates as bearded. The driving thought behind these 
logical categories of expression is the distinction between what one is talking 
about, the object one refers by using subjects, and what one is saying about it, the 
description or information one conveys of it by using predicates. 
I turn now to the interpretant. Peirce identified the interpretant of a sign-
vehicle with its role in communication.43 Accordingly, the third relatum of the 
sign relation in our example is the role of Helen’s utterance in communication. 
Given the context of the conversation, Joe interpreted Helen’s utterance as an 
assertion that Socrates was bearded. Strictly speaking, as Peirce suggested above, 
the interpretant of Helen’s utterance is Joe’s interpretation of it as a correct 
application of the predicate “was bearded” to Socrates. For Helen’s utterance 
combines the predicate “was bearded” with the name “Socrates”, by which the 
speaker refers to Socrates (i.e. the second relatum), and conveys information about 
                                                             
42 As Peirce, I use the adjective “logical” in contrast with “grammatical”. In other words, Peirce 
clearly thought that logical form is different from grammatical form.  
43 For a discussion of the notion of interpretant see Savan (1988), Liszka (1990), Hausman (1993), 
Short (1996), Liszka (1996), and Short (2007). 
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Socrates to Joe, namely, that Socrates had a growth of hair on his cheeks and 
chin. Since Joe interpreted Helen’s utterance as an assertion, he presumes that 
this information is correct.   
The main thrust of Peirce’s view of semiosis, as the above example 
illustrates, is that “nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign” (CP 2.308). 
Here the relevant sense of “interpretation” is that of a communicative activity, 
which is essentially social. By engaging in this activity, speakers and listeners 
cooperate to understand what a sign-vehicle signifies in the context of its 
occurrence by making qualifications, asking for explications, giving reasons, etc.44 
As such, the meaning of a sign-vehicle is not a mental image, nor a mental 
process, nor an entity (abstract or concrete) but rather its role in communication. 
This role is the interpretant of a sign-vehicle. 
Moreover, understanding the meaning of a linguistic expression, a 
sentence in particular, is not a matter of grasping truth-conditions. This would 
amount to reduce the sign relation to a mere dyadic relation of reference. For 
Peirce, communication and inference are intimately connected. As such, 
understanding the meaning of a linguistic expression is a matter of knowing how 
to use it in inference. In (CP 2.444, n1), Peirce remarked that “the illative [i.e., 
                                                             
44 This aspect of semiosis is crucial. Legg (2005) explores it and calls it “meaning fallibilism”.  
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inferential] relation is the primary and paramount semiotic relation […] the 
production of propositions is of the general nature of inference, so that inference is 
the essential function of the cognitive mind”.45 It becomes clear that Peirce 
thought that understanding the meaning of a sentence involves both its role in 
communication and inference.  
Let me briefly elaborate on this last claim by outlining the affinity of 
Peirce’s view of meaning understanding and inferentialism. Pape (2002) and 
Legg (2008) have argued that Peirce was an inferentialist.46  Inferentialism, 
roughly speaking, is the view that to understand the meaning of a sentence is to 
understand its role in inferential practice. 47 For example, from the premises “Rio 
de Janeiro is to the north of São Paulo” and “São Paulo is to the north of 
Curitiba” it is permissible to conclude “Rio de Janeiro is to the north of Curitiba”. 
From the premise “Peter loves Maria” it is permissible to conclude “Someone 
loves Maria”. This is obvious. But why are these inferences obvious? The 
                                                             
45 According to Peirce, one can distinguish three forms of inference: abduction, deduction, and 
induction (CP 2.266, 2.774). Abduction “is where we find some very curious circumstance, which 
would be explained by the supposition that it was a case of a certain general rule, and thereupon 
adopt that supposition" (CP 2.624). By induction, ''we conclude that facts, similar to observed 
facts, are true in cases not examined" (CP 2.636). Finally, in a deduction "the facts presented in the 
premisses could not under any imaginable circumstances be true without involving the truth of 
the conclusion" (CP 2.778). 
46 More precisely, Legg (2008: 118) argues that Peirce was a “Hyper-inferentialist”, which means 
that Peirce held the view that all mental content is inferential.  
47 Inferentialism has been advocated by many philosophers such as Sellars (2007). Nevertheless, 
the name “inferentialism” was first coined by Brandom (1994) to refer to his view on meaning 
and content. For other varieties of inferentialism, see Cozzo (1994) and Peregin (2015).  
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inferentialist’s answer is the following: to accept the aforementioned inferences 
involving the words “north” or “Someone” is part of grasping the meaning of 
those words. Alternatively, an inferentialist holds that to know the meaning of a 
word or a sentence is to know, implicitly, that if one uses that word or that 
sentence, certain inferences involving them ought to be accepted. The rules of 
inference involving an expression are meaning-constitutive. Accordingly, an 
inferentialist does not explain meaning in terms of a relation of representation 
between linguistic entities and an independently structured reality, but in terms 
of the use of words in inferential practice, which is just a part of communication.  
What is characteristic of the inferentialist approach is the view that 
meanings are the inferential roles that certain type of sounds and inscriptions 
acquire in virtue of being used in assertion and inference. Accordingly, 
inferentialists are committed to at least two important claims: (1) the meaning of 
a linguistic expression is not an object represented by such expression; and (2) 
meaning is normative in the sense that to say that a sentence is meaningful is to 
say that it ought to be used in a particular way in inference and communication. 
The main point here is that the Peirce’s view of semiosis supports the claim that 
Peirce was committed to (1) and (2). As a result, one can start a sketch of Peirce’s 
view of the proposition qua sign by acknowledging what Peirce did not mean by 
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“proposition”. On the one hand, Peirce rejected the view that propositions are 
entities. As such, Peircean proposition are in contrast with both so-called 
“Fregean” propositions, which are conceived as structured abstract entities, and 
“Russellian” propositions, which are conceived as complexes of ordinary 
concrete objects (the referents of words).48 On the other hand, Peirce rejected the 
view that propositions are psychological entities. Actually, Peirce criticized some 
German logicians of his time that used the word “proposition” (Satz) as the 
linguistic expression of a judgment (Urtheil) since they meant by “judgment” a 
psychological state.49 
So far, I have shown that the import of a proposition, as a sign, depends 
on its role in communication and inference. Accordingly, my question is this: 
How one should understand the notion of proposition according to this picture 
of semiosis and the sign relation? Since propositions are signs, a promising way 
to answer this question is to clarify the following three aspects of the proposition: 
(i) Propositions as sign-vehicles: this aspect concerns propositions as 
used in acts of communication. 
                                                             
48 See Russell (1903) and Frege (1984b).  
49 Peirce´s main targets were Sigwart and Schöder, see (EP 2.430). Peirce heavily criticized their 
view because “[t]o explain the proposition in terms of the "judgment" is to explain the self-
intelligible in terms of a psychical act, which is the most obscure of phenomena” (CP 2.309).  
83 
 
 
(ii) Propositions in relation to their objects: this aspect concerns 
propositions as being about something that is signified.   
(iii) Propositions in relation to their communicational effect: this aspect 
concerns propositions as signifying elements.  
In the sequel, I shall elaborate on the above tree aspects in an attempt to get a 
clearer picture of Peirce’s view of the proposition and its relation to Peirce’s view 
of assertion.  
 
3.3. Propositions as sign-vehicles and the type-token distinction 
What kind of sign is a proposition? Peirce wrote: “A proposition […] is not to be 
understood as the lingual expression of a judgment. It is, on the contrary, that 
sign of which the judgment is one replica and the lingual expression another” 
(EP 2.311, 1904). Interestingly, Peirce thought that both judgments and assertions 
are replicas of propositions. He meant by “replica” the token of a type.50 Thus, 
Peirce held that propositions, qua signs, are types. In addition, one should qualify 
that since assertions and judgments are paradigmatic examples of proposition-
                                                             
50 The type-token distinction is one of Peirce’s celebrated contributions to philosophy. Quine, for 
example, applied Peirce’s type-token distinction to sentences. See Quine (1986).  
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tokens, and assertions and judgments are acts, it follows that propositions are 
act-types.51  
However, Peirce’s view of propositions as acts-types raises at least three 
new questions. First, what Peirce meant by “Types” and “Tokens”? Second, since 
Peirce clearly distinguished a proposition from its assertion, what is the nature of 
propositions as act-types? And third, in which sense assertions are “replicas” of 
propositions? In the remaining part of this section, I will tackle these crucial 
questions.  
Let me give a first approximation to Peirce’s distinction between types and 
tokens by way of an example. Consider the number of words in the following 
line from Shakespeare’s Hamlet: 
Words, words, words. 
It is possible to distinguish two uses of “word” in the above line. According to a 
first use of “Word”, one may count one word; in another use of “Word”, one may 
count three different words. Peirce called words in the first sense “Types” and 
words in the second sense “Tokens” (CP 4.537). Thus, we have one word-type 
                                                             
51 Peirce understood judgment in terms of the act of assertion. He wrote: “Do we not all perceive 
that judgment is something closely allied to assertion? That is the view that ordinary speech 
entertains. A man or woman will be heard to use the phrase, "I says to myself." That is, judgment 
is held to be either no more than an assertion to oneself or at any rate something very like that (CP 
5.29).” Peirce understood “judgment” in terms of assertion to oneself. He thought that judgments 
are the cognitive counterparts of acts of assertion. 
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and three word-tokens. As this example shows, tokens are particular instances, 
ink marks on the page or vibrations in the air, of a general type.  
In addition, the same token can embody different sorts of types: “The 
word and its meaning are both general rules; but the word alone of the two 
prescribes the qualities of its replicas in themselves” (CP 2.292, 1902). Consider, 
for example, the following two words:  
Dog                         Dog 
The word “Dog” admits at least two uses. It can be used as a noun to refer to a 
mammal, and it can be used as a verb, which indicates the action of following 
someone persistently. These two uses of the word “Dog” can be codified as rules 
of interpretation or semantic types.52 Peirce called rules of interpretation 
“precepts” (EP 2.286, 1903). In addition, the word “Dog” also embodies another 
sort of type, namely, a syntactic type or rule of formation. This is the rule in 
respect to which the word “Dog” is considered a well-formed expression of 
English and it prescribes the qualities of its replicas, as Peirce claimed. 
Accordingly, “Dog” and “Tyke” are tokens of different syntactic types, but they 
express the same precept when one uses them to refer to a mammal. Hence, the 
                                                             
52 See Hilpinen (2012) for a similar distinction.  
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act of using a word can embody different semantic types (e.g. “Dog”) and the use 
of different words can embody the same semantic type (e.g. “Dog” and “Tyke”).  
Peirce extended the claim that a word and its meaning are both types to 
sentences used in spoken and written language. Peirce thought that a sentence 
and the proposition one expresses by the use of such sentence in a speech act are 
both types. The sentence is a type in the sense of a grammatical rule to compose a 
well-formed sentence of a language. A proposition-type is a “precept” in the 
sense of an implicit rule of correct use of a sentence in an assertoric context of 
utterance. However, the only we can count on is the act, for one does not (and 
need not) usually make explicit the rule involved in tokening the proposition 
(e.g. the predicate “dog” applies to this animal if and only if it is a dog). As this 
example illustrates, the identity of propositions consists partly in the fact that 
sentences can be used correctly or incorrectly, particularly in assertoric speech. In 
turn, the actual act of using the sentence in assertoric speech instantiates such 
prescription or rule of correct use of a sentence.53  
One advantage of Peirce’s distinction between types and tokens is that it 
allows achieving generality without any ontological commitment to abstract 
                                                             
53 One should note, though, that this prescription, which is implicit in discursive practice, is not 
necessarily explicit. As I shall show in what follows, Peirce thought that apprehending the 
meaning of a sentence consists in knowing how to use it correctly in assertoric practice. 
87 
 
 
entities: “In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token 
[...].” (ibid) As this passage shows, Peirce thought that all types require tokens.54 
Hence, a proposition-token is usually the utterance of a sentence used as a means 
to perform a speech act that occurs at a specific time and place. Peirce wrote: 
A sentence, in the sense here used, is a single object. Every time it is copied 
or pronounced, a new sentence is made. But a proposition is not a single 
thing and cannot properly be said to have any existence. Its mode of being 
consists in its possibility. (MS 599: 5–6, ca. 1902) 
According to Peirce, the expression of a proposition is only achievable through 
its replicas or tokens. On Peirce’s conception, proposition-tokens are simply 
utterances or inscriptions of sentences one uses as a means to perform a speech 
act, paradigmatically assertion. In other words, the ontological status of 
proposition-tokens is plain: vibrations in the air, marks on a page, etc., which 
occurs at a specific time and place. 
I turn now to the issue concerning the nature of propositions as act-types: 
what sort of act is a propositional act? According to Peirce, propositions, as act-
types, are acts of predication. He wrote: 
                                                             
54 Although Peirce claimed that types do not exist, some contemporary authors argue that types 
exist, for example, Wetzel (2009).  
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It may be asked what is the nature of the sign which joins “Socrates” to “__is 
wise,” so as to make the proposition “Socrates is wise.” […] But it is not the 
two signs “Socrates” and “wise” that are connected, but the replicas of them 
used in the sentence. We do not say that “__is wise,” as a general sign, is 
connected specially with Socrates, but only that it is so as here used. The two 
replicas of the words “Socrates” and “wise” are hic et nunc, and their junction 
is part of their occurrence hic et nunc. (EP 2.310) 
Peirce suggested here that adding a copula as an extra constituent of predication 
is a mistake. The mistake consists in not recognizing that predication is 
something that speakers do by producing replicas of propositions here and now 
using sentences. For example, Peirce thought that in using the sentence “Socrates 
is wise”, one refers to Socrates by using the name “Socrates” and describes him 
as being wise by using the predicate “is wise”. In this sense, the assertoric use of 
this sentence constitutes a proposition-token, an occurrence here and now of 
such proposition. In other words, Peirce thought that the combination hic ut nunc 
of a subject and a predicate results in “the kind of sign that conveys 
information”, which is the proposition (EP 2.275).55  
                                                             
55 Notably, this is Peirce’s solution to the problem of predication. This problem has its modern 
versions based on Bradley’s regress, see Bradley (1930), but it can also trace its root back to the so-
called “third man problem” in Plato’s Parmenides (132a–b). A contemporary treatment of this 
problem can be found in Davidson (2005).This is the problem that once plausible assignments of 
semantic roles have been made to the parts of sentences, the parts do not seem to compose a 
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It is in order to elaborate on Peirce’s view of predication as an act. One can 
distinguish at least two broad views of predication, namely, linguistic views and 
metaphysical views. In order to locate Peirce’s view and its import, I shall briefly 
introduce each one of them.   
Linguistic views of predication relate to the employment of a predicate, 
which is a linguistic expression, as a means to convey to others a feature of an 
object. Angelelli (1980:104) remarks: “In this proper sense predication appears as 
a relation between a linguistic expression (written word or spoken word or in 
fact any other sort of sign) and an object (normally extralinguistic)”. The driving 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
united whole. It is a problem at the semantic level that deals with how predicates are related to 
singular terms and contribute to the unity of the sentences one uses to token a proposition. For 
example, consider certain black cat. Suppose now that I utter, “The cat is black”. In doing so, I 
have said something true about the cat by combining the noun phrase “The cat” and the 
predicate phrase “is black”. But, what binds together these words into a single sentence that is 
true? The problem of predication concerns what makes a sentence like “The cat is black” a 
structural unit with a truth-value and not a mere list of words. In other words, the problem of 
predication consists in construing “predication” not as a merely syntactic concatenation or, 
alternatively, as a mere list of words, for example, <Socrates, is, mortal>. The problem of 
predication is so-called because any solution to it should explain the distinctive contribution 
made by predicates to the truth or falsity of sentences. As I have mentioned, Peirce thought that 
adding a copula as an extra constituent of predication is a mistake. The mistake consists in not 
recognizing that predication is something that speakers do. For example, Peirce thought that in 
using the sentence “Socrates is wise”, one refers to Socrates by using the name “Socrates” and 
describes him as being wise by using the predicate “is wise”. In this sense, the use of the sentence 
constitutes a proposition-token, an occurrence here and now of such proposition. One should 
note that understanding the connection between subject and predicate should not be confused 
with a theory of predicates. A theory of predicates aims to explain the nature and semantics of 
predicates. For present purposes, it is only required to understand how predicates can maintain 
their proper functions as parts of sentences while at the same time contribute to the unity of 
sentences in which they occur, the unity demanded by the fact that the proposition one expresses 
by the use of a sentence can be true or false.  
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thought behind this use of “predication” is that language users produce oral or 
written linguistic expressions in order to say something of an object.56 For 
example, when one uses the sentence “Socrates is bearded” to say something 
about Socrates, namely, that he has a growth of hair on his cheeks and chin.  
Accordingly, linguistic views construes “predication” as the relation 
between a predicate, which is a linguistic expression, and the object referred to 
by a singular term. As Quine (1960:96) remarked: "Predication joins a general 
term and a singular term to form a sentence that is true or false according as the 
general term is true or false of the object, if any, to which the singular term 
refers". Here the relevant notion of predication is called “linguistic” because the 
emphasis concerns the linguistic expressions one uses to talk about objects.  
By contrast, the driving thought behind metaphysical views of predication 
is that there are certain kinds of things, for example, particulars, kinds, properties 
and relations, which stand in certain ways in the world. As such, what is 
predicated of the object is not a linguistic predicate but rather an alleged property 
denoted by the linguistic predicate. For example, the cat being black, Socrates 
being human, Bob loving Maria, etc. Of course, things standing in certain ways in 
the world make linguistic predications true or false. For example, Socrates being 
                                                             
56 See Bogen (1985) for a similar distinction concerning the senses of “predication”.  
91 
 
 
bearded makes true the sentence “Socrates is bearded”. Accordingly, this view 
admits that the predicate “is bearded” applies to a bearded thing. However, the 
predicate “is bearded” applies to it in virtue of its being bearded, which means 
that it instantiates the property beardedness. As a result, this view construes 
“predication” as the relation between a property and the particulars that instantiate 
it. Here the relevant notion of predication is called “metaphysical” because the 
emphasis concerns the relation of instantiation, that is, the relation between a 
property and a thing that has such property.  
As the textual evidence so far discussed clearly suggests, Peirce’s use of 
the word “predication” is akin to the first sense just mentioned. Peirce rejected 
the idea that predicates denote properties. For Peirce, logical subjects and logical 
predicates are categories of expression with clear contributions to the role of 
propositions in inference. Logical subjects comprise both proper names (e.g. 
“Socrates”) and quantifiers (i.e. “someone” and “everyone”), which are used to 
refer to an individual object or a collection of objects. In turn, logical predicates 
comprise expressions like “is wise”, “loves”, “is between”, etc., which are used to 
characterize or describe the object (or objects) indicated by the subject (or 
subjects), as when one sticks a label with the word “Fragile” in a vase.57 In 
                                                             
57 I take this image from Angelelli (1980).  
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addition, according to Peirce, logical predicates can be monadic or one-place (e.g. 
“__is wise”), dyadic or two-place (e.g. “__loves__”), triadic or three-place (e.g. 
“__is between__and__”), etc.; see (EP 2.427).58 As I have mentioned, from Peirce’s 
logical point of view, the driving thought behind these logical categories of 
expression is the distinction between what one is talking about, the object one 
refers by using subjects, and what one is saying about it, the description or 
information one conveys of it by using predicates.  
I would like to stress that the main thrust of Peirce’s view of propositions 
as types is that predication is a type of act.59 For example, if Joe performs an act of 
assertion by means of uttering the sentence “Adriana is smart”, he is producing a 
token of a type, namely, the type of action of applying the predicate “smart” to 
                                                             
58 However, one should note that Peirce held that there is no ultimate logical analysis of a 
sentence: “what [a] predicate is considered to be depends upon how we choose to analyse it” (CP 
4.438). For example, Peirce considered that the predicate of the sentence “God gives some good to 
every man” can be analysed in several ways as follows:   
“__gives__to__ 
__gives some good to__ 
__gives__to every man 
God gives__to__ 
God gives some good to__ 
God gives__to every man 
__gives some good to every man 
God gives some good to every man 
In the last case the entire proposition is considered as a predicate [i.e. a zero-place predicate]” 
(ibid.). 
59 Recently, some authors have defended different versions of the view of propositions as types. 
For example, Johnston (2009) and Hanks (2015) developed different views of propositions as act-
types. Dummett (1996) and Soames (2010) developed different views of propositions as types 
whose tokens are mental or linguistic events.  
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Adriana. For Peirce, such “propositional act-type” is the proposition that 
Adriana is clever.60  
I am now in a position to suggest in which sense a speech act such as an 
assertion is a token of a proposition. It is clear that one does something more 
than saying in performing a speech act. In the case of assertion, for example, one 
undertakes a responsibility for the truth of what one says. By parity of reason, 
the situation is the same with the rest of speech acts: whenever one performs a 
speech act, one also instantiates a proposition.61 Peirce wrote: “[o]ne and the 
same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, inwardly inquired 
into, put as a question, wished, asked for, effectively commanded, taught, and 
does not thereby become a different proposition” (EP 2.312, 1904). Now, the 
crucial point here is that since Peirce claimed that all types require tokens, which 
entails that there are no uninstantited propositions-types, propositions are tied to 
speech acts, in particular, speech acts of assertion.  
In other words, since all proposition-types require tokens, in performing a 
speech act one instantiates a proposition-type. However, one cannot instantiate 
                                                             
60 For simplicity, I shall use the expressions “proposition-type” and “propositional act-type” as 
synonyms. Likewise, I shall use the expressions “proposition-token” and “propositional act-
token” as synonyms. 
61 Of course, not every utterance will constitute a proposition-token (e.g. when practicing English 
pronunciation) and some proposition-token are not performed by utterances, for example, 
written sentences or non-verbal signs like images or gestures (e.g. the hand signals used by 
commandos to indicate the position of the enemy, see MacFarlane (2011)). 
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propositions-types, as acts of predication, in isolation from speech acts. Let me 
explicate this important point by considering several examples. Suppose that a 
speaker and a listener are uttering the following sentences in suitable 
circumstances:  
(7) I promise that I will repair the fence.  
(8) Tom will open the door. 
It is clear that one who utters (7) is making a promise while one who utters (8) is 
usually making a request. It is also clear that each speech act was performed by 
the utterance of a different sentence. In addition, the two speakers tokened two 
different proposition-types: the performer of (7) said that he or she will repair the 
fence while the performer of (8) said that Tom will open the door.  
Let me introduce another example. Consider the following exchange 
between a primary school student and her history teacher:  
      S: Was Socrates a philosopher? 
      T: He was indeed a philosopher.  
The student is making a question while the teacher is making an assertion. 
However, there is a similarity between these performances: they token the same 
proposition-type. The student questioned that Socrates was a philosopher while 
the teacher asserted that he was so. This means that both the student and the 
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teacher have said the same, namely that Socrates was a philosopher. Thus, in 
performing their individual utterances, the student and the teacher have 
produced two different speech acts that token the same proposition-type.  
Likewise, one can token the same proposition-type and perform the same 
speech act by means of uttering different sentences.62 For example, suppose that 
two speakers utter in suitable circumstances “Miguel de Cervantes wrote Don 
Quixote” and “O manco de Lepanto escreveu Dom Quixote”. One can also token 
different proposition-types and perform the same speech act by means of 
uttering the same sentence. For example, suppose Tim utters “I am hungry” and 
Maria utters “I am hungry”. Two different propositions have been tokened, since 
the object is different in the two cases.  
As these examples show, it is clear that the identity criterion for 
proposition-types is different from that of speech acts. How one can determine 
the identity criterion of a proposition-type on a certain occasion? I shall tackle 
this question in the remaining part of this chapter.  
 
 
 
                                                             
62 Naturally, I shall focus on the speech act of assertion henceforth.  
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3.4. Propositions and objects 
Peirce thought that one can determine the identity of proposition-types by the 
context of utterance. By “context of utterance”, I mean the interpersonal context 
or circumstances in which a speech act is performed by the utterance or 
inscription of a sentence.63 Peirce wrote:  
If somebody rushes into a room and says, “There is a great fire!” we know he 
is talking about the neighborhood and not about the world of Arabian Nights’ 
entertainment. It is the circumstances under which the proposition is uttered 
or written which indicate that environment as that which is referred to (CP 
2.357, 1902).64 
For example, in the context of the above exchange between a student and a 
teacher it is clear that by using the name “Socrates” the student was asking about 
the man who was born in classical Athens in the year 470 BC, son of 
Sophroniscus, teacher of Plato, rather than the celebrated Brazilian soccer player. 
In addition, by applying the predicate “was a philosopher”, the teacher said 
about Socrates that he was engaged in the activity of philosophy.  
                                                             
63 For present purposes, I shall focus on assertoric contexts of utterance (i.e. the interpersonal 
context in which a speaker performs an assertion by an utterance). 
64 Peirce wrote that a proposition is “uttered or written”. This way of speaking does not mean that 
Peirce conflated sentence with proposition. In Section 2.2. I will show that Peirce applied the 
type-token distinction to propositions. So constituted, the utterance or inscription of a sentence as 
a means to perform a speech act constitutes a proposition-token.    
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As Hilpinen notes regarding the above passage, “[o]ne of the most 
interesting insights of Peirce’s theory of the proposition was his observation that 
the identity of the proposition uttered on a certain occasion is often determined 
by the context of utterance” (1992:478). For example, consider the assertoric 
utterance of the following two sentences in suitable circumstances:  
(9) The cat is on the mat. 
(10)  O gato está sobre o tapete. 
On the one hand, the inscription of (9) and (10) may be regarded as two different 
sentence-tokens of two different sentence-types, which are the syntactic rules to 
construct the sentences in English and Portuguese, respectively. On the other 
hand, the utterance of (9) and (10) may be regarded as two different proposition-
tokens of the same proposition-type. One can construe this proposition-type as 
the act of predicating the relation (or dyadic predicate) “is on” of the cat (Ferio) 
and the mat. For example, according to the context of utterance, (9) and (10) are 
about two objects, Ferio and a mat, in a certain relation. These objects are referred 
to by the noun phrases “The cat” and “the mat”, and “O gato” and “o tapete”. In 
addition, Ferio and the mat are described as being in a certain relation, which is 
expressed by the predicates “is on” and “está sobre”. These inflections indicate 
present time. Thus, if I challenge the speaker by uttering “How do you know?”, 
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she may reply “Come here and look!”. Thus, both sentences have been correctly 
used in an assertoric context of utterance. In addition, the same proposition act-
type has been instantiated by means of two different acts of assertion performed 
by using two different sentence from two different languages.  
It becomes clear that the context of utterance is directly related to Peirce’s 
semiotic notion of object. Indeed, Peirce thought that the notion of object 
comprehends anything one can talk about. In other words, the collection of 
people or objects to which one refers to by using logical subjects in a sentence, 
which Peirce called “Universe of Discourse”:  
In every proposition the circumstances of its enunciation show that it refers to 
some collection of individuals or of possibilities, which cannot be adequately 
described, but can only be indicated as something familiar to both speaker 
and auditor. At one time it may be the physical universe of sense, at another it 
may be the imaginary “world” of some play or novel, at another a range 
of possibilities (CP 2.536, 1902). 
As Peirce suggested in the above passage, the Universe of Discourse of an 
assertion or assertoric utterance of a sentence is usually given by the context of 
utterance in which the assertion is made.65 Let me consider an example adapted 
                                                             
65 At this point the question concerning fictional discourse arises. Hilpinen notes that “fictional 
discourse has as its object (i.e. as its ‘object-at-large’) some fictional universe (or perhaps a 
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from Nunberg (1995): Joe, a restaurant waiter, may utter to his replacement, “The 
ham sandwich left without paying”. Evidently, Joe has not asserted that the ham 
sandwich left without paying. Nonetheless, he has made an assertion, namely, he 
asserted that some client, the one who ordered the ham sandwich, left without 
paying. 
Accordingly, in respect to the object, a proposition is “a symbol that 
separately indicates its object” (EP 2.168, 1903). A proposition indicates its object 
“separately” in the sense that the subject of the proposition- token indicates the 
object independently of the predicate. Let me clarify this point by way of an 
example. Consider the assertoric utterance of the following sentence:  
(11) Socrates was a philosopher.  
One should note that in (11) the speaker used “Socrates” to refer to 
Socrates, and “was a philosopher” to characterize him as being a certain way. As 
I have mentioned, the driving thought behind these categories of expression is 
the distinction between what one is talking about, the object one refers by using 
subjects, and what one is saying about it, the description or information one 
conveys by using predicates. It is thus clear that predicating involves referring. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
collection of such universes), and fictional names refer (have as their special objects) fictional 
objects. Peirce seems to adopt this view when he says that the proposition ‘Hamlet was mad’ 
relates to [i.e., has as its object] a great creation more enduring than bronze. (CP 2.342).” Hilpinen 
(1992:479-480).   
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The function of referring is to indicate the object of what one is talking about as 
when one points out with a finger, say, to a vase. Referring is involved in 
predicating since by way of an act of predication one communicates what one is 
saying about the object as when one sticks a label with the word “Fragile” to a 
vase66. For example, the utterer of (11) is talking about Socrates by using the 
name “Socrates” to refer to him, and saying about him that he was engaged in 
the activity of philosophy by using the predicate “was a philosopher”. But,what 
Peirce meant by “referring”?67  
Peirce held that “[a] proper name, when one meets with it for the first 
time, is existentially connected with some percept or other equivalent individual 
knowledge of the individual it names” (CP 2.329, 1903). Thus, it is plausible to 
assume, as this passage suggests, that Peirce thought that the act of referring to 
an object by using a proper name depends on contextual, discursive, and 
epistemic factors.  
Accordingly, the scholarship on Peirce’s theory of proper names has 
stressed the affinities of his view with the so-called “new theory of reference” by 
                                                             
66 I take this perspicuous example from Angelelli (1981). 
67 This is a vexed question. Hilpinen (1995:286–7) and Short (2007:225-276) remark that Peirce’s 
affinities either lie against a descriptivist theory of names or with the direct reference tradition. 
Nonetheless, recent scholarship has taken a different route by rejecting the aforementioned 
emphasis and attempting to articulate an approach of names more close to Peirce´s notion of 
semiosis and context of utterance. For example, Boersema (2011) and Agler (2011). 
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drawing connections between Peirce’s comments on proper names and various 
aspects of the theory of names held by S. Kripke (1980).68 The new theory of 
reference holds that there is a causal chain of designation that begins with the 
first “grounding” of the name. Thus, each subsequent use of the name is causally 
linked to the first. One advantage of the causal theory of reference is its 
recognition of the importance of the initial act of naming. Emphasis on this 
originating moment is also important for Peirce. Consider an example offered by 
Peirce concerning the semantic roles of names. He wrote:  
It is convenient to regard such names as Theodore Roosevelt and Rudyard 
Kipling as singulars. They denote persons who we may roughly say are 
equally known to you and to me. However, my knowledge of Theodore 
Roosevelt or of Rudyard Kipling is a little different from yours. I have 
rather hazy recollections of having perceived a very young man at the club, 
in which perceptions there was a direct consciousness of a reaction, and I 
remember we used to say, "That young Theodore Roosevelt is going to be 
an important personage." I recollect to have perceived that name many 
times in the newspapers and to haven talked about the person referred to 
with his neighbors and relatives; and I recollect later perceiving in the 
White House a person who seemed to be the President, and who talked as 
                                                             
68 For example, Pape (1982:347), Thibaud (1987:527), Hilpinen (1995:286–7), DiLeo (1997:574, 592–
3), Maddalena (2006:29), and Short (2007:225, 276). 
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if he were acquainted with me. These circumstances have led me semi-
instinctively to suppose that one person preserving an identity through the 
continuity of space, time, character, memory, etc., has been one singular 
connected with all these phenomena; […] (EP 2.221-222)    
To be sure, this passage constitutes evidence that Peirce regarded contextual and 
epistemic factors as crucial to understand the semantic role of names. However, 
the new theory of reference makes use of notions such as that of a possible world, 
to which Peirce was clearly not committed. Thus, although this interpretation is 
to certain extent illuminating, it carries an exegetical burden that is practically 
unsustainable.  
Recent scholarship on Peirce’s view of names and singular terms takes a 
different route by attempting to articulate a semiotic approach of names closer to 
Peirce´s views. 69 As Eco (1976) clearly remarks, the first point to qualify contra 
descriptivist and causal interpretations of Peirce’s view of naming is that Peirce 
held that speakers, not expressions, refer. Agler (2011:612), who presented four 
relevant points to understand Peirce’s view on proper names, develops Eco’s 
point as follows:  
                                                             
69 For example, Boersema (2009) and Agler (2011). 
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(a) One uses proper names as indexical types governed by semiotic 
conventions.  
(b) One refers by using proper names to singular objects having logical 
(rather than physical) existence.70   
(c)  Names are non-descriptive and directly referential of their objects. 
(d)  Contextual, discursive, and epistemic factors are integral to a proper 
name’s designation of its referent.  
I would like to follow Agler’s line of interpretation concerning Peirce’s view of 
reference. In particular, I am interested in using this interpretation to understand 
the relation between referring and propositions. Accordingly, as Peirce suggests 
in (EP 2.310), the object referred by the subject (and described by the predicate) 
determines the identity criterion for propositions: one tokens the same 
proposition-type if the subject one uses to refer and the predicate one uses to 
describe a feature have the same object. For example, suppose that I have uttered 
                                                             
70 By “logical existence”, Agler means the use of names as hypostatic abstractions. Hypostatic 
abstraction is the logical operation that turns “predicates from being signs that we think or think 
through, into being subjects thought of” (CP 4.549). Mathematicians commonly use this form of 
abstraction. For example, the set abstraction “{x: x is a prime number}” functions as a singular 
term for the set of numbers whose members the predicate “is a prime number” applies. 
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“The spouse of Xanthippe was whiskered” and “Socrates was bearded”. In doing 
so, I have tokened the same proposition-type on two occasions.71  
Let me expand on this point. Peirce’s view of predication and reference 
suggests that a proposition-token comprehends a twofold function. Peirce wrote:  
In respect to being fragmentary, therefore, the two signs are alike. It may be 
said that "Socrates wise" does not make a sentence in the language at present 
used in logic, although in Greek it would. But it is important not to forget 
that no more do "Socrates" and "is wise" make a proposition unless there is 
something to indicate that they are to be taken as signs of the same object. 
(EP 2.310, 1904) 
In the above passage, Peirce develops further his recurring idea that what binds 
together subject and predicate is not a special sign, the copula, but an act. The 
relevant qualification Peirce made to this central idea is that using a sentence and 
thus producing a proposition-token indicates that the subject and the predicate of 
such sentence are to be taken together as signs of the same object. In other words, 
Peirce’s crucial idea is that the act of predicating, which involves the act of 
referring to an object by using a subject, and whose role as a sign is to convey a 
character of an object by using a predicate, produces a single proposition act-
                                                             
71 I have limited myself here to talk about Peirce’s views of names in relation to proposition-types. 
In Chapter 4, I will elaborate on Peirce’s view of the quantifiers.  
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token.72 Thus, given a certain context of utterance, two proposition-tokens 
instantiate the same proposition-type if and only if their subjects and predicates 
are signs of the same object.   
However, one might claim that there is a gap between the above criteria of 
identity for propositions, so formulated, and Peirce’s notion of sign as a triadic 
relation. For, even if Peirce conceived predication as an act, it seems that whether 
the subject and the predicate of a proposition-token indicate, in their respective 
qualified senses, the same object is a matter of a dyadic relation between a 
proposition-token and an object in the universe of discourse. This observation is 
relevant because it paves the way for introducing the crucial relation between 
propositions and assertability that I have annunciated from the beginning of this 
chapter. In the next and final section of this chapter, I will show how the notion 
of assertability enters into Peirce’s view of the proposition. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
72 Since, according to Peirce, all proposition-types require tokens and predicating is something 
one does in speech, I will focus on discussing proposition-tokens in the remaining part of this 
chapter.   
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3.5.  Propositions and assertability 
Since Peirce held that a proposition is an assertable sign, he was committed to the 
view that the concept of proposition should be understood in terms of 
assertability rather than actual assertion. In addition, since Peirce held a view of 
propositions as act-types, Peirce was also committed to the view that all 
proposition-tokens are assertable. However, this last consequence is not a 
platitude. As I showed in section 3.3., Peirce claimed that one can instantiate 
proposition-types by means of performing any speech act. Why Peirce held that 
propositions are essentially related to assertability? The purpose of this last 
section is to tackle this crucial question for Peirce’s view of the proposition.  
So far, it is clear that the object determines the identity of a proposition-
token. However, one aspect of the proposition qua sign is missing. Such aspect is 
the role of propositions as signifying elements or interpretants. Under Peirce’s 
view of the sign as a triadic relation, if a proposition is not interpreted as a sign of 
an object, then it is meaningless. In turn, interpreting a proposition-token as a 
sign of an object consists in understanding its role in communication and 
inference. Given the central role of assertion in inference and communication, it 
is clear that interpreting a proposition-token as a sign of an object ultimately 
depends on its assertability. In this sense, Peirce thought that there is an essential 
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relation between the notion of proposition and the notion of assertability. Let me 
elaborate on this crucial idea of Peirce’s view of the proposition.  
Peirce thought that two proposition-tokens instantiate the same 
proposition-type if and only if their subjects and predicates are signs of the same 
object. However, even if predication is construed as an act, this claim requires 
qualification because it conveys a mere dyadic relation between proposition-
tokens and objects. How is it possible for speakers and listeners to interpret 
proposition-tokens as signs of objects? Peirce wrote: 
A man, tramping along a weary and solitary road, meets an individual of 
strange mien, who says, "There was a fire in Megara." If this should happen 
in the Middle United States, there might very likely be some village in the 
neighborhood called Megara. Or it may refer to one of the ancient cities of 
Megara,  or to some romance. And the time is wholly indefinite. In short, 
nothing at all is conveyed, until the person addressed asks, "Where?"—"Oh 
about half a mile along there" pointing to whence he came. "And when?" 
"As I passed." Now an item of information has been conveyed, because it 
has been stated relatively to a well-understood common experience. (EP 
2.478) 
Since to assert a proposition is to commit oneself to defend it, Peirce held that the 
interpersonal aspect of assertion is crucial to understand what is conveyed by the 
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instantiation of a proposition-token. Indeed, a necessary condition to understand 
what is conveyed by the use of a proposition-token is that speaker and listener 
should share a common experience. By “common experience”, Peirce meant “all 
that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the 
outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function” (ibid).  
Peirce’s main point, as the above example illustrates, is that the assertoric 
utterance of a sentence involves a context in which speaker and listener are able 
to make qualifications, ask questions, give reasons, etc., and thus cooperate to 
find an object of common experience of which something has been predicated by 
using the proposition-token.  
Since in an assertoric context of utterance the speaker and listener are able 
to cooperate in order to find the object indicated by the proposition-token and to 
determine whether the predicate used by the speaker applies or not applies to 
the object, the relation between propositions and assertability hinges on the 
criteria of identity of propositions as signs of objects. Peirce wrote:  
In "John is in love with Helen," the object signified is the pair, John and 
Helen. But the "is in love with" signifies the form this sign represents itself 
to represent John-and-Helen's Form to be. That this is so is shown by the 
precise equivalence between any verb in the indicative and the same made 
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the object of "I tell you": "Jesus wept" = "I tell you that Jesus wept." (EP 
2.478) 
In this passage, Peirce suggested that if an indicative sentence is not assertable, 
such sentence could not be a proposition-token. Thus, according to Peirce, the 
link between propositions and assertability is grounded on the idea that 
assertoric utterances can be evaluated as correct or incorrect in respect to a 
specific context of utterance. Hence, Peirce suggested that the criteria of identity 
of propositions as signs of objects depend on the possibility of its assertion. 
The plausibility of this view resides on Peirce’s view of propositions as 
predicative act-types. The role of a proposition as a sign is to convey information 
about an object. But, according to Peirce, this role must be ultimately fulfilled in 
assertoric practice because in such practice speakers and listeners are able to 
cooperate in order to find an object of common experience of which something 
has been said by using the proposition-token. Can speakers and listeners 
cooperate to find such object by commanding, promising, etc.? Peirce’s answer is 
negative, for the speech act of assertion is the single act by means of which a 
speaker undertakes a responsibility for the truth of a proposition. As such, 
responsibility for truth presupposes the meaningfulness of what is asserted. 
Accordingly, if a proposition is not assertable, then it would not be tokened 
110 
 
 
because, for Peirce, one cannot convey something about nothing: “every kind of 
proposition is either meaningless or has a real Secondness as its object” (EP 
2.279). By “real Secondness”, Peirce meant here a member of the universe of 
discourse. Since Peirce thought that all types require tokens, it follows that the 
criteria of identity of propositions used hic et nunc depend on the possibility of its 
assertion. 
Peirce’s view that propositions are assertable signs, as explicated above, 
has an interesting consequence, which is that the main semantic properties of 
propositions relate to what would result in its assertion: “I grant that the normal 
use of a proposition is to affirm it; and its chief logical properties relate to what 
would result in reference to its affirmation” (EP 2:311-312).  In the sequel, I will 
attempt to elaborate on this complementary point. 
As I have mentioned, Peirce’s view is that if a proposition is not assertable, 
then it is meaningless. Since assertability relates to two possibilities, namely, the 
correct and incorrect use of a sentence in assertoric practice, I interpret this view 
as saying that the predicates “being correctly used” and “being incorrectly used” 
are contraries, for their application presupposes an object to which a predicate 
has been applied. The contradictory of “being used” is “being useless”, for 
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applying the later presupposes that there is no object to which a predicate has 
been applied.  
So constituted, when one makes (correct or incorrect) assertoric use of a 
sentence, one’s addressee presupposes that there is an object (or objects) in 
respect to which she can evaluate the correctness of the assertoric act. Returning 
to a previous example, one would use the sentence “Ferio is on the mat” 
correctly if indeed Ferio were on the mat, and thus the proposition asserted 
would be true. If Ferio were not on the mat, the proposition would be false and 
one would have used the sentence incorrectly. On the other hand, if there were 
no cat, the utterance of both “Ferio is on the mat” and “Ferio is not on the mat” 
would be meaningless. 
Peirce’s point, as I interpret it, hints at distinguishing the cases in which a 
proposition-type is tokened from the cases in which it is not tokened. Let me 
elaborate further on this distinction. Consider, for example, the utterance of the 
following two sentences:  
(12)  Angela Merkel is the president of Brazil. 
(13)  The present king of France is bald.  
The adequate reconstruction of these cases according to Peirce is the following: in 
uttering (12), the speaker is usually making an assertion. Accordingly, the 
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listener understands the utterance as a commitment to vindicate the content of 
this sentence. Thus, it should be possible to establish whether Angela Merkel is 
indeed the president of Brazil. Since Angela Merkel is not the president of Brazil, 
it is clear then that in making assertoric use of (12), the speaker is incorrectly 
applying a predicate to the object she is referring by “Angela Merkel”, who is the 
actual Chancellor of Germany. 
On the other hand, in uttering (13) one is not tokening a proposition-type. 
As I have mentioned, the contradictory of “being used” is “being useless”, which 
presupposes that there is no object to which a predicate has been applied. It is 
clear that (13) is assertorically useless because there is no speaker that can 
undertake the commitment to find the actual king of France or give evidence 
supporting the claim that he exists at the time of the utterance. This treatment 
clearly reflects Peirce’s insight in (EP 2.478) that a speaker cannot convey 
information by the use of a sentence unless “it has been stated relatively to a 
well-understood common experience”. Accordingly, Peirce would regard (13) as 
a meaningless sentence, because the potential assertoric use of such sentence fails 
to be a sign of an object in the Universe of Discourse.  
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3.6.  Final remarks 
In this chapter, I have attempted to take a step further in the understanding of 
Peirce’s view of assertion by elaborating on his view of the proposition. In short, 
propositions are assertable signs in the sense of being types. Such types are 
tokened in the performance of a speech act, and their criteria of identity depends 
on the possibility of its assertion. 
Peirce’s view of proposition as a sign capable of being asserted is, to be 
sure, interesting not just for historical and exegetical reasons. The dialectics of the 
contemporary debate on propositions has taken for granted that either 
propositions are the referents of that-clauses or they are pure conventions. To be 
sure, Peirce’s view of assertion in terms of a duty to give reasons and his view of 
the proposition in terms of assertability is a plausible alternative to understand 
the notion of proposition without embracing either Platonism or 
conventionalism. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Assertion and Vindicatory Commitment 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Peirce held that a speaker S asserts a proposition p if and only if S is morally 
responsible to give reasons for p. Here the notion of reason comprises two broad 
categories, namely, evidence and argument.73 For example, if a prosecutor asserts 
that the accused is guilty of murder, she can fulfill her duty to give reasons for 
such proposition by presenting the murder weapon with the DNA of the 
accused. Likewise, if a mathematician asserts that there are no whole number 
solutions to the equation xn + yn = zn when n is greater than 2, unless xyz=0, she 
should fulfill her duty to give reasons for such proposition by presenting a proof.  
However, assertion, as a moral act, is a form of interpersonal and, more 
generally, social interaction. As such, speakers, as asserters, acknowledge 
vindicatory obligations while listeners, as addressees, attribute such obligations. 
                                                             
73 I use the term “evidence” in its ordinary sense, which comprises both information and physical 
objects. Some philosophical accounts of evidence deviate from its ordinary use. For example, 
Williamson (2000) argues that one's evidence consists of the totality of propositions that one 
knows.  
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Hence, it is still unclear how Peirce’s view of vindicatory commitment construes 
the interpersonal interaction between asserters and addressees. To be sure, 
clarifying this aspect is relevant for a proper understanding of Peirce’s view of 
assertion.  
In this chapter, I will argue that Peirce construed “vindicatory 
commitment” dialogically. This means that asserters are proponents who have 
the duty to defend a proposition p and addressees are opponents who have the 
right to challenge p. As such, the lawyer and the mathematician, for example, are 
open to the challenges of their respective opponents (i.e. the peers of the 
mathematician and the defense attorney representing the accused). Thus, 
according to Peirce, they are open to the possibility of retraction. I base my case 
for this interpretation on Peirce’s dialogical semantics for quantified sentences.  
In section 4.2., I will introduce Peirce’s dialogical semantics for the 
universal quantifier “all” and the existential quantifier “some”. In section 4.3., I 
will develop an argument for the claim that Peirce held a dialogical view of 
vindicatory commitment.  The argument proceeds by showing, first, that Peirce 
construed the relation between the asserter and addressee as a symmetrical 
relation, and second, that the perspectives of the asserter and the listener are 
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those of a first-person and a second-person, respectively. 74 Finally, in section 4.4., 
I will address the question concerning Peirce’s view of the relation between 
assertion, understood as a dialogical vindicatory commitment, and truth. 
 
4.2. Peirce’s dialogical semantics for the quantifiers 
Peirce’s view of assertion in terms of the speaker’s moral vindicatory 
commitment entails that assertoric practice is a form of interpersonal interaction. 
This interaction involves the relationship between speakers and listeners qua 
asserters and addressees, respectively. In other words, since Peirce thought that 
asserters make commitments to their addressees, he was committed to the view 
that there is a relation between undertaking a commitment and a social 
discursive structure.  
In addition, since acts of assertion are subject to evaluation as correct or 
incorrect, the asserter and the addressee have deontic statuses, namely, asserters 
have obligations while addressees have permissions. Evidently, if the speaker 
does not fulfill her duty, she has made an incorrect assertion. Accordingly, 
addressees have the right to ask speakers to fulfill their vindicatory commitments 
and to criticize speakers that do not fulfill their obligations. How Peirce 
                                                             
74 For an extensive discussion of the second-person standpoint in Ethics, see Darwall (2006).  
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articulated the duties of asserters and the rights of speakers in assertoric practice? 
By tackling this question in the light of Peirce’s comments on quantifiers, I will 
attempt to clarify the interpersonal aspect of Peirce’s notion of vindicatory 
commitment. In other words, I will attempt to go from semantics to pragmatics. 
In particular, I will show that Peirce’s dialogical semantics for quantified 
sentences suggests a dialogical conception of vindicatory commitment.75 I use the 
word “semantics” in the sense that the rules Peirce offered for the quantifiers 
provide an explication of its meaning.  
Peirce thought that quantified phrases like “all” and “some” are 
indeterminate indices. This means that when one uses quantified phrases, one 
indicates or refers to an object (or objects) indeterminately. He called the form of 
indeterminacy expressed by an existential quantifier “indefiniteness”, and the 
form of indeterminacy expressed by the universal quantifier “generality”. As it is 
clear in (CP 2.330), Peirce attempted to solve the problem posed by the 
indeterminacy of quantified phrases by interpreting them as prescriptions, 
implicit in our habits of inference, which tell the asserter and the addressee how 
                                                             
75 For Peirce as a precursor of game-semantics see Hilpinen (1982). For Peirce as one of the 
precursors of the dialogical interpretation of quantifiers, see Marion (2012).  
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they ought to act in order to find an object (or objects) in the universe of 
discourse to which the predicative part of the sentence is applicable.76 
Accordingly, Peirce interpreted the existential quantifier and the universal 
quantifier in the following way: “’Some’ means that the speaker is to select an 
instance, while ‘Every’ or ‘Any’ means that a second person is to perform the 
selection” (CP 2.523). Peirce’s dialogical semantics for quantifiers can be 
informally introduced as follows: let P stand for the proponent as the defender 
and O stand for the opponent as the attacker. The dialogue begins with P 
uttering a quantified sentence and O challenging it, with the players moving in 
alternate turns. The rules that capture the meaning of the quantifiers are as 
follows: when P asserts ∀xF(x), O chooses a value for x and then P ought to show 
that the predicate F applies to the selected value of x. When P asserts ∃xF(x), then 
O asks P to choose a value for x to which the predicate F applies. 77 I shall clarify 
further the import of these rules by considering two examples given by Peirce. 
                                                             
76 Peirce called this sort of prescriptions “precepts” (EP 2.168) and “leading principles” (CP. 
2.589). He construe them as verbal expressions of “habits of inference” (CP 2.186, 3.160, 3.164).  
77 Peirce’s interpretation of the existential quantifier seems to commit him to the view that the 
proponent must show the instance. Suppose that a man is found dead with a knife in his back. To 
be sure, one can assert that someone killed the man, but one is not in a position to find the 
assassin in order to give reasons for one’s assertion. One should note that Peirce admits as a 
reason not just an instance but also an index of existence. An example of an index of existence is 
the footprint on the sand in Dafoe’s Robinson Crusoe. In this setting, Crusoe is permitted to assert 
that someone else is on the island. The footprint, as an index of existence, is an adequate reason. 
Likewise, the knife in the man’s back is an index of the assassin. Thus, one is permitted to assert 
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The first example concerns the difference between asserting that some 
sinners are miserable and asserting that all sinners are miserable. Peirce wrote:  
[…] If I guarantee to find a miserable sinner, of course, I guarantee there is a 
sinner in the world. But if I turn the responsibility of picking out the sinner 
to you, I do not guarantee you can find one. I only say if you do find one, 
he will turn out miserable. This is the distinction between Universal and 
Particular propositions. (CP 2.453) 
Peirce’s use of the expressions “if I guarantee” and “if I turn the responsibility of 
picking up the sinner to you” exemplifies how the asserter and the addressee 
alternate their roles in order to assess the assertion of a quantified proposition. 
Let me adapt Peirce’s example to an specific context. Consider a priest and a 
parishioner having a pleasant conversation. The priest asserts that some sinners 
are miserable. The dialogue for this assertion opens with the parishioner 
exercising her right to challenge it. Then, the priest has thereby the duty to 
defend it by selecting a sinner that turns out to be miserable. Now, suppose that 
the priest asserts that all sinners are miserable. In contrast with the former case, 
the parisher is entitled to pick ad libitum any sinner. She finds a sinner that seems 
very happy, herself. Unfortunately, the priest fails to show that she is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that someone killed the man. Thanks to Marcelo Carvalho for pointed out this objection (in 
conversation). 
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unconfortable with her life. Since there seems to be at least one happy sinner, the 
priest retracts his assertion.  
According to Peirce’s explication of the meaning of quantified sentences 
above, the asserter and the addressee alternate their roles in order to assess the 
correctnes of the speakers’ assertion. Hence, it is clear that Peirce construed the 
relation between speaker and listener as a symmetrical relation.  
The second example is the assertion of the proposition that some woman 
is adored by every catholic. For Peirce “This means that a well-disposed person 
with sufficient means could find an index whose object should be a woman such 
that allowing an ill-disposed person to select an index whose object should be a 
Catholic, that Catholic would adore that woman” (EP 2.168). The “well-
disposed” person is the asserter or proponent while the “ill disposed” person is 
the addressee or opponent. The proponent has the duty to select an index of a 
woman. By “index”, Peirce meant any sign that one could use to refer to an object 
in the universe of discourse (e.g. a proper name).78 In turn, the opponent has the 
right to select an index of a Catholic, which in turn would adore the woman 
referred by the proponent.  
                                                             
78 As the above passage suggests, Peirce was assuming that the “indexes” or names to be used 
denote objects in the universe of discourse.   
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Suppose that the priest and the parishoner are the proponent and 
opponent, respectively. The priest defends by asserting that Mary is loved by 
every Catholic.79 The parishoner attacks by attempting to find a Catholic that 
does not adore Mary, but fails. Thus, the priest has honoured his duty as an 
asserter.  
Since Peirce conceived the addressee as an opponent, who is entitled to 
challenge, it follows that he construed the addressee’s standpoint as a second-
person perspective. The second-person perspective is the standpoint you and I take 
up when assessing the correctness of an act, in this case an act of assertion. Thus, 
according to Peirce’s dialogical semantics for the quantifiers, addressees have the 
right to challenge the proposition asserted by asking for reasons.80  
 
4.3. Peirce’s dialogical interpretation of “vindicatory 
commitment” 
There are at least two important consequences of Peirce’s dialogical semantics for 
the quantifiers: 
(1) The relation between speaker and listener is a symmetrical relation. 
                                                             
79 The priest is referring to Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ. 
80 For an extensive discussion of the second-person standpoint in Ethics, see Darwall (2006).  
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(2) The perspectives of speaker and listener are those of a first-person and a 
second-person respectively.  
Peirce’s dialogical construal of the interpersonal aspect of assertion hinges on (1) 
and (2). Of course, one can oppose to this construal a monological construal of the 
interpersonal aspect of assertion, which hinges on the following two claims:  
(3) The relation between speaker and listener is an asymmetrical relation. 
(4) The perspectives of speaker and listener are those of a first-person and a 
third-person respectively.  
In the remaining part of this section, I will show how the above two different 
construals of the interpersonal aspect of assertion shape in different ways the 
notion of vindicatory commitment. As a result, I will clarify the import of Peirce’s 
view of vindicatory commitment.  
I shall begin by clarifying how the monological and dialogical construals 
of the interpersonal aspect of assertion entail different views of vindicatory 
commitment. What is the relation between the interpersonal aspect of assertion 
and the notion of vindicatory commitment? Since the deontic status of asserters 
is that of obligation, it is clear that they ought to vindicate the propositions they 
assert. One should note that the deontic status of asserters relates to the deontic 
attitudes of both asserters and interpreters: asserters acknowledge vindicatory 
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commitments while addressees attribute such commitments. In turn, the deontic 
attitudes of asserters and addressees relates to the way that the vindicatory 
commitment is assessed in assertoric practice. Now, the essential point here is that 
when one considers the construal of these attitudes and, therefore, the specific 
way asserters and addressees assess the vindicatory commitment involved in 
assertion, the asymmetry or symmetry between speaker and hearer is decisive.  
If one endorses the claim that assertion is interpersonal in the sense of an 
asymmetrical relation between the first-person and the third-person perspective, 
then acknowledging a commitment is definable in terms of others taking one as 
committed. Under this view, the vindicatory commitment is assessed as follows: 
others (third-person perspective/observers) are authorized to reassert the 
asserted proposition on the asserter's authority, deferring to the asserter for its 
vindication. I shall call this view the “monological” interpretation of vindicatory 
commitment.81 By contrast, if one endorses the claim that assertion is 
interpersonal in the sense of a symmetrical relation between the first-person and 
the second-person perspective, then acknowledging a commitment is not 
definable in terms of an opponent attributing such commitment. Under this 
view, the vindicatory commitment is assessed as follows: You (second-person 
                                                             
81 Henceforth “MIVC”. 
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perspective/opponent) are authorized to challenge the asserter. I shall call this 
view the “dialogical” interpretation of vindicatory commitment.82  
Let me briefly elaborate on the difference between MIVC and DIVC by 
way of a comparison. Consider Brandom’s construal of the interpersonal aspect 
of assertion. Brandom reduces the notion of acknowledging a commitment in 
terms of attributing a commitment. He remarks: 
The fundamental concept of the metalanguage employed in specifying the 
model of assertional practice is that of the deontic attitude attributing a 
commitment. For the deontic attitude of undertaking a commitment is 
definable in terms of attribution: undertaking a commitment is doing 
something that licenses or entitles others to attribute it. Brandom (1994:196) 
Although Brandom (1994:54) claims that the social structure of speech is an “I-
Thou” sociality, he does not incorporate (1) and (2) into the interpersonal aspect 
of assertion specifically. Indeed, in discussing his construal of de re and de dicto 
ascriptions with Habermas (2000), Brandom (2000) offers the example of a 
prosecutor and a defence attorney arguing over the trustworthiness of a 
pathological liar about to take the stand. The point of the example is to illustrate 
how the assessment of the vindicatory commitment works in assertoric practice. 
                                                             
82 Henceforth “DIVC”. 
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Brandom focuses on the relation between the defense attorney and “others”, 
which is an asymmetrical relation, and not on the relation between the defense 
attorney and the prosecutor. The reason for this is that Brandom identifies the 
addressee with a third-person perspective that assesses the utterance of a 
speaker.83 
However, Brandom’s focus on the audience rather than on the attorneys 
seems to be inadequate. As Habermas clearly puts it:84 
Interestingly, Brandom singles out the indirect communication of the 
speakers with the spectators who are listening to them—rather than the 
communication of those directly involved—as the paradigmatic case. 
Certainly, in the courtroom the judges hearing the case and the jury listening 
to it are the ones who are keeping score, as it were, of how the discussion is 
progressing and are forming a judgment as to who is scoring points in order 
to be able to say in the end, for example, how the statement of the 
controversial witness is to be assessed. During the dispute, however, a 
reaction is required not from the listeners but from the parties directly 
involved who address their utterances to one another and who expect each 
other to take positions. Listeners have a different role than hearers. The 
listeners take on the role of third persons waiting to see what happens, while 
                                                             
83 See Brandom (1994:54;137;639). 
84 See also Marion (2012:149). 
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those directly involved adopt a performative attitude and, in thus taking 
toward each other the attitude of a first person toward a second, expect a 
response from each other—regardless of whether this be a positive or 
negative assessment or an abstention. Habermas (2000:345) 
Habermas’ point is that Brandom’s view of the act of attributing, which crucial 
for assertoric practice, is not performed by a second-person perspective. 
Accordingly, Brandom is committed to identify the listener with an observer 
who assesses the utterance of a speaker and not with an opponent who is 
expected to reply to the speaker. It becomes clear that Brandom’s explication of 
how the assessment of vindicatory commitment works is a consequence of his 
view that acknowledging a commitment is definable in terms of others taking 
speakers as committed. 
By contrast, consider the structure of Peirce’s dialogical semantics for the 
quantifiers:  
 ∀ ∃ 
Assertion P asserts ∀xA P asserts ∃xA 
Attack O challenges: ∀x/c  
for any c that O 
chooses  
O challenges ∃ 
xA 
Defence P defends: A[x/c] P defends: A[x/c]  
for any c that P 
chooses 
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It is clear that the structure of Peirce’s semantics for the quantifiers hinges on (1) 
and (2). Accordingly, Peirce is committed to identify the listener with an 
opponent who assesses the utterance of a speaker by repliying to the latter. As 
such, the listener is not an observer who assesses the utterance of a speaker by 
defering the proposition asserted to the latter for its vindication. It becomes clear 
that Peirce’s explication of how the assessment of vindicatory commitment 
works is a consequence of his view that acknowledging a commitment is not 
definable in terms of others taking speakers as committed. Indeed, Peirce had 
reasons to claim that even a solitary assertion is an interpersonal act, for “solitary 
dialectic is still of the nature of dialogue” as the vernacular use of “I say to 
myself” indicates (CP 5.546). In other words, if one endorses the claim that 
assertion is interpersonal in the sense of a symmetrical relation between the first-
person and the second-person perspective, then acknowledging a commitment is 
not definable in terms of an opponent attributing such commitment.  
Consequently, Peirce thought that the normative attitudes are irreducible 
elements of assertoric practice. As the structure of Peirce’s dialogical semantics 
for the quantifiers shows, the symmetric relation between asserter and addressee 
guarantees an alternation of acknowledgements and attributions. Thus, the 
addressees’ right to challenge is not equivalent to the right to defer to the speaker 
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for vindication. On the contrary, when exercing the right of challenging, the 
addressee has an active role in assesing the reasons offered by the asserter. In 
other words, Peirce identifies the addressee with an opponent who shares a 
common purpose with the asserter: to build mutual understanding. As such, the 
asserter has the duty to defend p by giving reasons while the addressee has the 
right to challenge p by asking for reasons.  
The main point I have attempted to make by way of this comparison 
between two related but subtly different views of the interpersonal aspect of 
assertion is that Peirce’s endorsement of (1) and (2) committed him to a dialogical 
interpretation of vindicatory commitment. Under this interpretation, asserter and 
addressee hold a symmetrical relation in which the addressee takes the 
perspective of a second-person. As such, the addressee does not exhaust his role 
by being authorized to reassert the proposition asserted and deferring to the 
asserter for its vindication. For Peirce, the addressee has an irreducible role in 
assessing the asserter’s vindicatory commitment by exercising the right to 
challenge the asserter and, in turn, cashing out the asserter’s duty to defend a 
proposition by giving reasons.  
Peirce’s dialogical interpretation of vindicatory commitment is very 
familiar. It seems that when one is judged responsible in virtue of performing an 
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act it is assumed that one is committed to do something. Thus, listeners are not 
just permitted to criticize and correct those asserters who do not comply with 
their vindicatory commitments but they are also entitled to challenge them in the 
first instance. From the second-person perspective involved in holding the 
speaker responsible, the opponent is concerned with how appropriately the 
speaker should honor the vindicatory commitment acquired in virtue of 
performing an act of assertion. Peirce’s semantics for the quantifiers clearly 
reflects this important point. 
Peirce’s dialogical interpretation of vindicatory commitment has at least 
two interesting consequences. First, since the opponent is concerned with the 
adequacy of the reasons given by the speaker in order to honor the vindicatory 
commitment, asserters ought to give good reasons for the propositions they 
assert. Second, and more importantly, since addressees have the right to 
challenge asserters, the duty to defend that p is not equivalent to the duty of 
actually telling that p is true.85 Let me clarify this point. Asserters ought to give 
good reasons for the propositions they assert. As such, when one asserts that p 
                                                             
85 Of course, Peirce held that every true proposition is assertable. However, this claim has 
interesting consequences for Peirce’s epistemology. If every true proposition is assertable, then 
every true proposition is vindicable. Therefore, every true proposition is knowable. It follows 
from this consequence that Peirce was committed to the so-called “knowability paradox”, which 
says that if any truth can be known then every truth is in fact known. More precisely, ∀p(p → 
◊Kp) ⊢ ∀p(p → Kp). Hilpinen (2004) explores Peirce’s commitment to this paradox and formulates 
an interesting Peircean solution to it. 
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one must have already acknowledged the possibility of a challenge to it.86 But 
being committed to defend that p by giving good reasons entails that one could 
fail to defend that p and, consequently, that one could retract one’s assertion that 
p. By “retracting”, I mean to render an act of assertion null, as when a retracted 
offer is canceled. Thus, the vindicatory commitment involved in assertoric 
practice can be fully understood only through its relation to both the speech act 
of challenging and retracting, as it is suggested by Peirce’s semantics for the 
quantifiers. 
In sum, since Peirce understood the interpersonal relation involved in 
assertion as a symmetrical relation between a first-person and a second-person 
perspective, as entailed by his semantics for the quantifiers, it follows that Peirce 
construed “vindicatory commitment” dialogically. This means that the speaker 
has the duty to defend that p by giving reasons and the listener has the right to 
attack that p by asking for reasons. In turn, this entails that assertion, as a moral 
act, involves an irreducibly relationship between a proponent (I, the asserter, 
first-person perspective) and an opponent (You, the addressee, second-person 
perspective).  
                                                             
86 For this last point, see Marion (2012).   
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Accordingly, I shall rephrase Peirce’s view of assertion as follows: A 
speaker S asserts that p if and only if S has the moral duty to defend p by giving 
good reasons to a listener L and L has the right to challenge p by asking for 
reasons.87 
 
4.4. Dialogical vindicatory commitment and truth 
Peirce understood “responsibility for truth” as a dialogical vindicatory 
commitment. This view raises a relevant question: What is the relation between 
assertion and truth?  In this section, I will attempt to outline an answer to this 
vexed question.  
Let me begin by sketching Peirce’s view of truth.88 Peirce’s view of truth 
hinges on the practice of inquiry. Peirce meant by “inquiry” a dialectical 
interplay between belief and doubt. He clearly conveys this thought in the 
following excerpt:  
[…] You only puzzle yourself by talking of this metaphysical "truth" and 
metaphysical "falsity," that you know nothing about. […] if by truth and 
falsity you mean something not definable in terms of doubt and belief in any 
                                                             
87 Interestingly, Peirce’s view of assertion is an almost unexplored antecedent of the dialogical 
tradition in logic. For similar formulations of this view, see Lorenz (1981:20) and Marion 
(2012:148). 
88 A detailed introduction of Peirce’s view of truth would exceed the scope of this thesis. For a 
notable work on Peirce’s view of assertion, see Misak (1991). 
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way, then you are talking of entities of whose existence you can know 
nothing, and which Ockham’s razor would clean shave off. Your problems 
would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want to know the 
"Truth," you were simply to say that you want to attain a state of belief 
unassailable by doubt. (EP 2.336, 1905) 
Here Peirce rejected metaphysical views of truth. The point is bold: there is no 
much more to say about truth besides that a true belief is one that is undefeatable 
by doubt. Peirce characterized doubt as a state of disruption and irritation, a state 
where one’s practical reasoning and action no longer comply with belief (W 
3:246, 1878). By contrast, Peirce characterized belief as a state of stability and 
easiness in which one is disposed to use one’s beliefs almost unreflectively in 
practical reasoning and action.89Evidently, Peirce thought that if one finds 
recalcitrant evidence against a belief, doubt impetuously arises. As a result, 
whenever one doubts, one is willing to end the disruption. In other words, one is 
willing to inquiry in order to attain a state unassailable by doubt.90  
Since inquiry is the practice by means of which one settles belief, Peirce 
held the view that a proposition, what is believed or doubted, can be either true 
                                                             
89 Peirce’s view of belief was influenced by Alexander Bain’s dispositionalist theory of belief. This 
theory hinges on the idea being that a belief is whatever disposes us to act. See Bain (1859). 
90 On this point, see Hookway (2004b:130).  
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or false. However, Peirce’s main qualification regarding this view is that a 
proposition cannot directly furnish reasons for it being either true or false (EP 
2.276, 1903). The reasons must come from the practice of inquiry. As such, a true 
proposition is one that is undoubtable at the end of inquiry (EP 2.204; 336; 347).  
I turn now to the relation between truth and assertion. I have mentioned 
that Peirce construed “inquiry” as a dialectical interplay between belief and 
doubt. One should note that this interplay matches the dialogical interplay 
between proponent and opponent involved in assertoric practice. Indeed, the 
parties involved in the practice of inquiry can be gathered into two broad 
categories, namely, proponents attempting to defend a proposition p and 
opponents attempting to challenge p.  My point is the following: if one conceives 
inquiry as a kind of assertoric practice, one can discern how Peirce related 
assertion to truth.  
Let me elaborate on this claim by considering the directions of fit of the act 
of asserting a proposition according to Peirce's view of assertion.91 By “direction 
of fit”, I mean the direction of the “match” between the world and a speech act of 
                                                             
91 I take this way of glossing this point from Searle’s use of the distinction between directions of 
fit to analyze different speech acts in Searle (1979). This distinction was originally developed by 
Anscome (1963).   
134 
 
 
assertion that is required for the latter to be correct.92 A corollary of Peirce’s view 
of assertion as a dialogical vindicatory commitment is that an assertion that p is 
correct if and only if the speaker has good reasons to defend p upon challenge. 
Hence, according to Peirce’s view, assertion has word-to-world direction of fit 
because the correct assertion of a proposition-token must match the world. For 
example, consider again Tim asserting that the cat is on the sofa. If Tim asserted 
correctly, then he ought to be able to show the cat, Ferio, on the sofa as conveyed 
by the proposition he asserted.  
Speakers assert propositions, which can be either true or false. Since 
assertion has word-to-world direction of fit, the truth-value of a proposition must 
originate at the boundary where language meets the world. Peirce’s dialogical 
semantics for the quantifiers shows that such boundary is action. Peirce wrote: 
Every proposition refers to some index: universal propositions to the 
universe, through the environment common to speaker and auditor, which 
is an index of what the speaker is talking about. But the particular 
proposition asserts that, with sufficient means, in that universe would be 
found an object to which the subject term would be applicable, and to 
                                                             
92 I shall clarify that the term “world” here has no ontological weight. It is a mere substitute for 
Peirce’s notion of “universe of discourse”, which I introduced in Chapter 3.  
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which further examination would prove that the image called up by the 
predicate was also applicable. (CP 2.369) 
As this passage suggests, Peirce thought that a correct assertion relates to certain 
actions concerning the object of the proposition asserted, namely, the actions that 
show that the use of the predicate applied to the object(s) fits the world. In other 
words, a correct assertion relates to the actions that show that the proposition 
asserted is unchallengeable by an opponent. Accordingly, I shall gloss Peirce’s 
view of the relation between assertion and truth as follows: a proposition is true 
if and only if its assertion is correct (i.e. unchallengeable at the end of the 
dialogue).93  
What about mathematical assertions? In the case of mathematics, Peirce 
thought that the meting point between assertion and truth is the act of proving. 
He wrote:  
As a fact, I have not the slightest doubt that twice two is four; nor have you. 
Then let us not pretend to doubt mathematical demonstrations of 
mathematical propositions so long as they are not open to mathematical 
                                                             
93 The root of Peirce’s view of the relation between assertion and truth has been developed by 
various philosophers. Notably, Dewey (1938:9) characterized truth in terms of “warranted 
assertability”, which is how he construed the notion of assertoric correctness. In turn, Dewey 
influenced Dummett (1991) and Putnam (1981).  
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criticism and have been submitted to sufficient examination and revision. 
(2.192, c.1902) 
For Peirce, an assertion of a mathematical proposition is correct if and only if the 
speaker gives a sound proof of such proposition. However, this view leads to the 
issue concerning the relevant notion of proof: even if one assumes that a 
mathematical proposition is true if and only if one gives a proof of it, it is still not 
clear what one means by “proof” here. Let me clarify this issue by briefly 
introducing two contrary views concerning the notion of proof.   
Prawitz (1998) claims that a mathematical proposition p is true if and only 
if there is a proof of p. However, he holds that the existential quantifier in his 
formulation ranges over an abstract object. For Prawitz, a proof is an abstract 
object that the mathematician discovers and represents by means of offering a 
particular proof. By contrast, Dummett (1998) claims that a mathematical 
proposition is true if and only if one constructs a proof of it or possess a method 
that generates a proof (or a disproof). One can easily identify the point of 
disagreement between Prawitz and Dummett by way of an example. Consider 
Fermat's last Theorem. According to Prawitz’s view, this theorem was true 
before Andrew Wiles completed his celebrated proof. In other words, since 
proofs qua abstract objects are atemporal, Fermat's last Theorem was already 
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true; mathematicians simply did not know it. By contrast, according to 
Dummett’s view, when Wiles offered his proof, and overcame certain challenges 
from his peers, it became permissible to assert  the proposition that there are no 
whole number solutions to the equation xn + yn = zn when n is greater than 2, 
unless xyz=0. Before that, this proposition was only a conjecture.  
Unfortunately, Peirce did not address the issue concerning the relevant 
notion of proof for his view of assertion. However, recent work on Peirce’s 
philosophy of mathematics, for example, Pietarinen (2006), suggests that Peirce 
sympathized with mathematical constructivism. If this interpretation is correct, 
then one may plausible assume that Peirce’s view of proofs is akin to that of 
Dummett’s. Of course, Dummett’s view is a plausible but controversial. Since 
this topic is still obscure within Peirce scholarship, I shall clarify that I am merely 
suggesting an affinity between Peirce and Dummett regarding the relation 
between truth and assertion in mathematics, which is a relevant issue for 
proponents of the commitment account of assertion.  
Finally, I shall consider two possible objections to Peirce’s view of the 
relation between assertion and truth. On the one hand, one might object that 
such relation is a mere ideal for inquiry. In ordinary assertoric practice, there are 
no firm standards of assertoric correctness. Moreover, addressees not usually 
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engage in evaluating speakers’ assertions. Thus, actual assertoric practice does 
not furnish evidence that Peirce’s view of the relation between assertion and 
truth is plausible. On the other hand, one might object that Peirce’s view is too 
radical, for it seems to convey that in ordinary assertoric practice, addressees 
ought to continually challenge asserters. But if this were the case, conversation 
and action are in risk of paralysis.  
A possible reply to the first objection is that Peirce’s philosophical project 
aims at understanding assertoric practice not to explain actual assertoric practice. 
In addition, it seems that actual assertoric practice is at least consistent with 
Peirce’s view of assertion as a dialogical vindicatory commitment. As Rescorla 
(2009:115) clearly puts it, “[in] ordinary conversation, we frequently adduce a 
speaker’s ‘conversational commitments.’ We say that a speaker is committed to 
some proposition, or to some proposition being true. We criticize a speaker who 
cannot defend his conversational commitments when faced with challenges or 
counter-arguments”. To be sure, the dialogical interplay of ordinary conversation 
involves an element of evaluation. This element might be weak, but it is 
perceptible enough.  
A possible reply to the second objection is that Peirce’s view of the relation 
between assertion and truth assumes fallibilism. Peirce coined the term 
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“fallibilism” to convey the view that one should remain open to new reasons and 
thus to the possibility that one has made an incorrect assertion. Thus, one should 
remain open to challenges and the possibility of retraction.94 However, Peirce’s 
fallibilism, so understood, holds that it is possible to remain open to challenges, 
and to the possibility of retraction, while also reasonably endorsing a proposition 
for the purposes of current inquiry and action. To be sure, fallibilism is a 
controversial view, but it is plausible enough to accommodate this objection. 95  
 
4.5. Final remarks 
In this chapter, I have attempted to clarify further Peirce’s construal of the notion 
of vindicatory commitment. By discussing Peirce’s semantics for quantified 
sentences, I have argued that Peirce entertain a dialogical interpretation of 
“vindicatory commitment”. This interpretation has two main features. First, 
Peirce construed the relation between the asserter and addressee as a 
symmetrical relation. Second, the perspectives of the asserter and the listener are 
those of a first-person and a second-person respectively. Hence, Peirce 
interpreted “vindicatory commitmen” in terms of the asserter’s duty to defend 
                                                             
94 See (CP 1.13-14, 1897). 
95 For a general and compact picture of fallibilism, see Leite (2010:370). For a discussion of Peirce’s 
fallibilism, see Cooke (2006).  
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that p with respect to an opponent, a second-person perspective, having the right 
to challenge that p.  
For Peirce, assertoric practice involves a symmetrical relation between two 
normative primitives: obligation or the duty to defend, and permission or the 
right to attack. In other words, if one is responsible for the truth of p, one’s 
listener acquires the right to challenge p by asking for reasons while one 
undertakes the duty to defend p by giving reasons. We have thus a dialogical 
social practice of giving and asking for reasons, as it were, in which assertion is 
the basic move. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Objections to Peirce’s View of Assertion 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present two objections to Peirce’s view of 
assertion and some possible replies to them. These are the main objections that 
have been presented against the commitment account of assertion, which is the 
view of assertion that has its roots in Peirce, and are crucially relevant for any 
attempt to elaborate on Peirce’s view of assertion.  
The first objection, which I introduce in section 5.2., is due to Pagin (2004), 
a major opponent of commitment accounts of assertion. He argues that the 
utterance of explicit assertoric sentences, which Peirce’s view sanctions as 
assertions, do not count as assertions. He does this by presenting as a 
counterexample the “inferential integration” test. This test attempts to show that 
one cannot successfully substitute explicit assertoric sentences for their indicative 
counterparts in inference because such substitution affects truth-preservation. 
This objection targets Peirce’s idea of understanding the speech act of assertion 
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as the undertaking of a certain kind of responsibility. In section 5.2.1., I reply to 
this objection by using Peirce’s distinction between a proposition and its 
assertion and Peirce’s view of propositions. In particular, I use Peirce’s insight in 
(EP 2.478) that the assertoric utterance of an indicative sentence is equivalent to 
the utterance of an explicit assertoric sentence.  
In section 5.3., I introduce the second objection, which consists in a general 
counterexample against commitment accounts of assertion. This objection, due to 
MacFarlane (2011), targets Peirce’s notion of vindicatory commitment by putting 
forward the case of a defense attorney that overtly commits to defend her client. 
According to McFarlane, the lawyer undertakes the duty to give reasons for the 
proposition that her client is innocent but she has not asserted such proposition. 
Since Peirce’s view sanctions the lawyer as asserting the innocence of her client, 
MacFarlane’s counterexample targets Peirce’s idea of understanding the speech 
act of assertion as a vindicatory commitment. In section 5.3.1., I use Peirce’s 
dialogical interpretation of vindicatory commitment to reply to this objection. In 
particular, I use Peirce’s insight that to assert that p is not equivalent to say that p 
is true.  
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5.2. First objection: Pagin’s “inferential integration” test 
According to Pagin (2004), if to assert is to undertake a commitment to the truth 
of a proposition, then one could assert that p by uttering sentences of the form:  
         () I here thereby commit myself to the truth of the statement that-s.  
In other words, since utterances of sentences of the form () and assertoric 
utterances of indicative sentences should have the same normative effect on the 
speaker, the utterances of both kinds of sentences should count as assertions that 
p. According to Pagin, the only difference between uttering an indicative 
sentence and sentences of the form () is that the latter are explicit assertoric 
sentences.   
Pagin then contends that by uttering sentences of the form () one 
commits oneself to the truth of a proposition p and one does not assert that p. 
According to Pagin, this contention can be substantiated by way of a test, which 
he calls the “inferential integration” test. Pagin writes: 
An assertion, whether direct or indirect, should integrate inferentially with 
other assertions of the speaker. By that I mean that any assertion should 
provide a premise for inferences jointly with the other assertions, of the 
same speaker or of other speakers taking part in the conversation. For 
instance, if I assert that p, directly or indirectly, and also assert that if p, then 
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q, then the statement that q is a consequence of my assertions. So, if I 
perform an indirect assertion that p by means of an utterance, then 
inferentially it should be as if I had performed a direct assertion. And so it 
is, I think, with irony and with rhetorical questions, to the extent that these 
are used for indirect assertions. Pagin (2004:851) 
The inferential integration test “is meant to test the claim that an utterance of a 
particular sentence s constitutes an assertion that p, directly or indirectly.” (ibid.) 
Accordingly, Pagin strategy consists in showing that the commitment account 
would wrongly count as assertions that p utterances of sentences that do not 
entail that p. Pagin considers the following two inferences:  
    Inference 1: If 73 is a prime number, we cannot share the stones equally. 
                          73 is nicely divisible [Ironic Premise]. 
                          Thus, we cannot share the stones equally. 
    Inference 2: If 73 is a prime number, we cannot share the stones equally. 
                            I commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number. 
                          Thus, we cannot share the stones equally. 
In contrast with Inference 1, in which the utterance of the ironic premise “73 is 
nicely divisible” can take the place of the assertion that 73 is a prime number, Pagin 
claims that the premise “I commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a 
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prime number” cannot substitute an assertion that 73 is a prime number in 
Inference 2. And the reason Pagin adduces is that “to get the desired conclusion 
[in Inference 2] in a truth preserving way, a further premise (such as ‘if I commit 
myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number, then 73 is a prime 
number’) would have to be added” (ibid). As a result, Pagin concludes that “I 
commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number” does not 
itself count as an assertion that 73 is a prime number. Thus, one should reject the 
commitment account of assertion. 
 
5.2.1. Reply to the first objection 
One should note that Pagin bases his argument on the assumption that explicit 
assertoric sentences expressing a commitment to the truth of a proposition 
should be able to take the place of assertions in inferences. To be sure, to attack 
this assumption would constitute an unacceptable price argumentation. 
However, Pagin is orthodoxly assuming the truth-conditional semantic 
interpretation of the notions of proposition, implication, and truth-preservation, 
and such interpretation is not beyond controversy. Hence, it seems a better 
option to block Pagin’s conclusion that “I commit myself to the truth of the 
statement that 73 is a prime number” cannot take the place of an assertion that 73 
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is a prime number in Inference 2 by taking distance from his truth-conditional 
semantic interpretation. Following this route, I shall suggest a reply to resist 
Pagin’s objection.96  
Which is Pagin’s criterion of identity for propositions in the inferential 
integration test? In order to answer this question, I shall present the notion on 
which Pagin’s inferential integration test hinges, which is the notion of correct 
inference. Pagin writes: 
Let’s understand an inference to be correct provided that the truth of 
propositions that are asserted by utterances of the premises guarantees the 
truth of the proposition that is asserted by an utterance of the conclusion. 
Where there is no such guarantee, the inference is incorrect (obviously, 
indexicality does require extra qualifications, but I have omitted those). 
This understanding of correctness is, I think, faithful to our intuitions. 
Pagin (2004:851-852) 
According to this understanding of correct inference, Pagin claims that Inference 
1 is a correct inference. In other words, he claims that the truth of the proposition 
                                                             
96 Two major replies to Pagin have been offered. First, MacFarlane (2011) argues that the 
inferential test does not show that uttering “I commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 
is a prime number” is not a way of asserting that 73 is a prime number. According to MacFarlane 
by uttering sentences like “I commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime 
number” one performs two assertions. Second, Pegan (2009) replied to Pagin’s objection by 
weakening the commitment account of assertion and ruling out the counterexample. See Pagin 
(2009) for his rejoinder. 
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asserted by the utterance of the ironic premise “73 is nicely divisible”, which is 
that 73 is a prime number, in addition to the truth of the proposition asserted by 
the utterance of the premise “If 73 is a prime number, we cannot share the stones 
equally” guarantees the truth of the proposition that is asserted by an utterance 
of the conclusion “we cannot share the stones equally”.  
By contrast, Pagin claims that Inference 2 is an incorrect inference. Since 
Pagin sees no problem with the premise “If 73 is a prime number, we cannot 
share the stones equally”, it follows that his point is that the truth of the proposition 
asserted by the utterance of the explicit assertoric sentence “I commit myself to 
the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number” fails to guarantee the truth 
of the conclusion. Why? Evidently, Pagin suggests that one asserts the same 
proposition by the uttering “73 is a prime number” and “73 is nicely divisible” 
while one asserts different propositions by uttering “I commit myself to the truth 
of the statement that 73 is a prime number” and “73 is a prime number”. 
Let me elaborate on this last point by using some formal apparatus due to 
Rescher (1968).  In his “Logic of assertion”, Rescher supplements the orthodox 
syntax of propositional and quantificational logic with the “A-operator” or “Ax”. 
Accordingly, in the case of propositional logic, the formulas of a propositional 
language L take the following form: “Axp”, where p stands for any propositional 
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constant. Rescher interpreted sentences of this form as “the assertor x asserts the 
proposition p”.  
Now, according to this formalism, Inference 1 and Inference 2 are 
rendered as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to capture Pagin’s point, I have assigned different propositional 
constants to the proposition asserted by the utterance of the ironic premise “73 is 
nicely divisible” in Inference 1* and the proposition asserted by the utterance of 
the explicit assertoric premise “I commit myself to the truth of the statement that 
73 is a prime number” in Inference 2*. This clarifies the reason Pagin thinks one 
needs to add an additional premise to Inference 2 to get the desired conclusion 
as exemplified in the following inference:  
                       Inference 3 
(1) Ax(c→a) 
(2) Ax(a→b) 
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(3) Axc 
Thus, Axb 
Hence, my question is this: which proposition one asserts by uttering “I 
commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number”? Pagin 
does not answer this question. He simply begins by stipulating a characterization 
of correctness and then claims that Inference 2 “is not intuitively correct” 
(2004:852). However, I do not see how the inferential integration test shows that 
one asserts different propositions when one utters “I commit myself to the truth 
of the statement that 73 is a prime number” and “73 is a prime number”. In other 
words, I do not see how Pagin’s notion of correctness imposes a criterion of 
identity for propositions such that Inference 2 turns out to be intuitively invalid.  
Accordingly, I shall use Peirce’s distinction between a proposition and its 
assertion and Peirce’s view of propositions to show that the utterances of “I 
commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number” and “73 is 
a prime number” have the same role in inference and, thus, are equivalent.  
Firstly, Peirce’s distinction between a proposition and its assertion as 
mirrored in explicit assertoric sentences is relevant here. When one asserts a 
proposition by using a that-clause, one always does it in the utterance of an 
explicit assertoric sentence. It is clear that the sentence “I commit myself to the 
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truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number” does not involve an assertoric 
verb. However, it functions as an explicit assertoric sentence whose subordinate 
clause is “that 73 is a prime number”. Following Peirce’s terminology, the 
proposition strictly expressed by this sentence is that 73 is a prime number. The 
act of assertion is captured by the assertive clause “I commit myself to the truth 
of the statement”, which conveys that someone is performing such act.  
Now, the main point one can draw from Peirce’s view is that one should 
not conflate the act with its content. Thus, there is no reason to conflate what is 
expressed by the assertive clause with the proposition expressed by the 
corresponding dependent clause. As Peirce remarked: “That this is so is shown 
by the precise equivalence between any verb in the indicative and the same made 
the object of "I tell you": "Jesus wept" = "I tell you that Jesus wept” (EP 2.478). 
Note that Pagin is committed to the claim that the utterances of sentences such as 
“I assert that 73 is a prime number” are not assertions, which is implausible. He 
acknowledges this problem when he recognizes that “[t]here is a good reason to 
suspect that my refutation method overgenerates counterexamples […]” Pagin 
(2004:854).   
I turn now to show in which sense the utterances of “I commit myself to 
the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number” and “73 is a prime number” 
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have the same role in inference. If one accepts Peirce’s account of propositions in 
terms of types, one might argue that the assertoric use of these sentences 
constitute different tokens of the same proposition-type, namely, that 73 is a 
prime number.  
Accordingly, if one uses Peirce’s criteria of identity for propositions in 
terms of the possibility of its assertion, the question concerning the identity 
criteria of the proposition tokened by “I commit myself to the truth of the 
statement that 73 is a prime number” and the proposition tokened by the 
utterance of “73 is a prime number” is to be answered in terms of the asserter’s 
vindicatory commitment. The adequate way of honoring one’s vindicatory 
commitment for these sentences is the same, namely, advancing a proof that 73 is 
only divisible by 1 and 73. Such proof establishes that the predicate “is a prime 
number” applies to the number 73. While making such proof, I could perfectly 
write on the board “I commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a 
prime number”, but the fact that I committed myself to vindicate such statement 
has no effect on the proof. The situation is the same in the case of a proof using as 
premise “73 is a prime number”. As conclusions of the same proof, “I commit 
myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number” and “73 is a prime 
number” instantiate the same proposition-type, which is the act of predicating of 
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73 that it is a prime number. Thus, one can token the same proposition-type by 
the assertoric use of “I commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a 
prime number” and “73 is a prime number”. Therefore, Inference 2 is a correct 
inference.   
Secondly, one can reply to Pagin in a different way by using the 
distinction between direct and indirect commitments, which is in complete 
agreement with Peirce’s view of assertion. Rescher (1968) develops this 
distinction as follows: 
It is important to distinguish between those specific propositions overtly 
and explicitly put forward on certain historical occasions and those to which 
he becomes implicitly committed in virtue of the explicit assertions he 
overtly makes. These later will be the 'tacit' assertions that are covertly or 
implicitly contained in what is overtly asserted, but of whose very content 
the assertor may well be unaware, failing entirely to realize his tacit 
commitment thereto. It is this second, implicit mode of assertion or 
'commitment to assert' - in contradistinction to overt and explicit assertion 
- that is of fundamental interest for the construction of a 'logic of assertion'. 
Rescher (1968:250) 
Rescher interprets the A-operator in terms of a “commitment to assert”. One 
should qualify that the commitment to assert can be either implicit or explicit. 
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For example, suppose that Tim asserts that the rose is red. It follows from what 
Tim asserted that some rose is colored. Accordingly, one says that Tim is directly 
committed to the proposition that the rose is red and indirectly committed to the 
proposition that some rose is colored. In general, we say that by asserting that p 
one is indirectly committed to the consequences of p. According to Rescher, this 
distinction manifests itself in the postulation of the rule: If x asserts p, and p 
entails q, then x asserts q.  
Now, if one assumes Pagin’s notion of correct inference strictly, which 
sanctions all classically valid inferences as correct, one should note that the 
conditional “If I hereby commit myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a 
prime number, then 73 is a prime number”, which Pagin endorses, is vacuously 
true. Thus, the inference from this vacuous conditional and “I hereby commit 
myself to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number” to the conclusion 
that “73 is a prime number” is classically valid and correct under Pagin’s notion 
of correct inference.  
Following Rescher’s rule, which is classically valid, since “I commit myself 
to the truth of the statement that 73 is a prime number” vacuously implies “73 is 
a prime number”, it follows that if one asserts “I commit myself to the truth of 
the statement that 73 is a prime number”, then one implicitly asserts “73 is a 
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prime number”. In turn, Pagin (2004:851) claims that “if I assert that p, directly or 
indirectly, and also assert that if p, then q, then the statement that q is a 
consequence of my assertions.” Therefore, Inference 2 is correct even by Pagin’s 
own standard of correctness.  
 
5.3. Second objection: McFarlane’s lawyer case 
I shall now introduce an objection to Peirce´s account of assertion based on 
MacFarlane (2011).97 The objection consists in a simple counterexample to 
Peirce’s construal of responsibility for truth as a vindicatory commitment. I shall 
call this counterexample the “Lawyer case”:    
[…] suppose I hire a lawyer to defend me in a criminal trial. I might ask her 
to sign a contract that commits her to vindicating my innocence in the face of 
challenges. It seems to me that she can sign this contract, and do so overtly, 
without having asserted that I am innocent. When she is at home with her 
family, she might assert to them that I am guilty, and she would not be 
subject to criticism for having asserted contradictory things. MacFarlane 
(2011:95) 
                                                             
97 MacFarlane’s objection is a special case of a general objection to commitment accounts of 
assertion due to Pagin (2004). 
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MacFarlane rightly assumes that if one characterizes the speech act of asserting 
as the undertaking of a vindicatory commitment, then any form of overt 
commitment to vindicate a proposition, for example, signing a contract, should 
count as an assertion. Accordingly, the lawyer case attempts to show that an 
epistemic explanation of “responsibility for truth” in terms of vindication seems 
to wrongly count as assertions that p forms of overt commitment to vindicate that 
p such as the lawyer’s signed contract. 
Let me illustrate this counterexample by way of an example. Suppose that 
a prosecutor has accused John of murdering someone. Immediately, John hires 
the best lawyer in town for his defense. In the contract for legal representation 
signed by John’s lawyer, one can read the following clause:  
            (L) I hereby commit to vindicate that you are innocent upon challenge.  
According to Peirce’s account, it is clear that the contract signed by the lawyer 
should count as an assertion that John is innocent. Did the lawyer assert that 
John is innocent? According to MacFarlane, it seems that this is not the case. 
Thus, if MacFarlane is right, the lawyer case shows that it is possible for a 
speaker to undertake a commitment to vindicate a proposition and not thereby 
assert that proposition. Thus, if this counterexample works, Peirce’s account 
appears to face a serious difficulty. 
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5.3.1. Reply to the second objection 
In reply, I shall argue that if one accepts Peirce’s dialogical interpretation of 
vindicatory commitment, then one can defuse the lawyer case. It is common 
ground in this debate that uttering (L) should have the same normative effect on 
the lawyer as the lawyer’s utterance of the sentence “I assert that you are 
innocent”. According to McFarlane, it is intuitive that in uttering (L) the lawyer is 
not asserting that her client is innocent. I shall note that McFarlane does not 
clarify why it seems that the lawyer is not asserting when she utters (L). Perhaps 
he is assuming that to assert that p is, in some sense, to tell that p is true. 
However, McFarlane assumption depends on how one conceives the 
interpersonal relation between speaker and listener.  
Considering this point, I should note from the outset that the lawyer case 
depends on the assumption that speakers undertake vindicatory commitments in 
isolation from the interpersonal aspect of assertion. Indeed, the counterexample 
works at its full capacity when one assumes no relation whatsoever between 
normative attitudes and the interpersonal relation between speaker and listener. 
This means that it is assumed that in uttering (L) there is no clear relation to an 
assessment or criticism by others, let alone an assessment by an opponent or 
second-person perspective. According to this picture, to assert is to put forward a 
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proposition as true by undertaking a vindicatory commitment. Indeed, at the end 
of his paper, MacFarlane (2011:95) suggests that “Brandom’s authorization of 
others to reassert the asserted content, deferring to one for its vindication” could 
shed some light on how to tackle the lawyer case. This is certainly a good insight. 
However, as MacFarlane suggests, this condition is not sufficiently strong.  
I would like to suggest that Peirce’s dialogical conception of vindicatory 
commitment defuses the lawyer case by rejecting the assumption that a 
vindicatory commitment is just a commitment to give reasons in isolation from a 
social structure.98 In particular, it seems inappropriate to detach the notion of 
vindicatory commitment from a dialogical social structure. As I have argued in 
Chapter 4, according to Peirce’s dialogical setting, the asserter has the duty to 
defend that p in respect to a listener that has the right to challenge that p. In other 
words, Peirce embedded the notion of vindicatory commitment into a dialogical 
social structure in which the relation between speaker and hearer is a 
symmetrical relation between a first-person perspective and a second-person 
perspective.  
If the relation between the speaker and listener is symmetrical, then the 
speaker’s duty to defend that p is not isolated from the listener’s right to attack 
                                                             
98 One should note that the main difference between Brandom and Peirce in this respect is thus 
symmetry.    
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that p. If assertion is not to be understood in isolation from the speech act of 
challenge, then a speaker cannot undertake the commitment to vindicate that p 
and at the same time not acknowledging the possibility of a challenge to p on the 
part of the listener. In other words, under a dialogical interpretation of 
vindicatory commitment, the asserter’s duty to defend that p entails the 
addressee’s right to challenge that p. As a result, the asserter can retract the 
assertion that p. Therefore, in asserting that p one is not actually telling that p is 
true.99  
Let me apply this consequence of Peirce’s dialogical view of vindicatory 
commitment to the lawyer case. On the one hand, MacFarlane’s  intuition seems 
to be that if one asserts a proposition, one actually tells the truth. To be sure, this 
intuiton renders the claim that the lawyer asserts that the client is innocent 
unplausible. However, this intuition is misleading. Why? According to Peirce’s 
view, one should not conflate the lawyer’s commitment to vindicate the 
proposition that John is innocent with the commitment to tell that such 
proposition is actually true.  
On the other hand, how should John’s lawyer honour her commitment? If 
one follows Peirce’s dialogical interpretation of vindicatory commitment, it 
                                                             
99 For an elaboration of this general point, see Rescorla (2009).   
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becomes clear that the right focus is on the relation between John’s lawyer, as a 
defense attorney, and the prosecutor. The simple duty of the defense attorney is 
to defend that the client is innocent against the challenges of the prosecutor. 
Hence, John’s lawyer cannot undertake the duty to defend the proposition that 
John is innocent and, at the same time, not acknowledging the right of the 
prosecutor to challenge such proposition. In this sense, John’s lawyer asserted 
that John is innocent by signing a contract that commits her to vindicate that he is 
innocent. 
Is so striking to claim that defense attorneys assert the innocence of their 
clients? Notably, Goldberg (2015) answers this question in the negative. In 
contrast with MacFarlane’s intuition, Goldberg notes that in a court of law, and 
in a philosophy seminar, assertions are  made. Moreover, these cases seem to 
provide supporting evidence for the commitment view of assertion. Indeed, 
“[t]he proponent of the commitment view might well claim support in the fact 
that in these sorts of professional settings the commitment is explicitly adopted 
by the speaker; after all, this is what we would have expected if the commitment 
view were true” Goldberg (2015:31).  
In relation to the case at issue, Goldberg (2015:30) remarks that “In a court 
of law, lawyers for each side make all sorts of assertions—indeed, they are bound 
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by their profession to make all sorts of assertions—even under conditions in which 
they do not so much as believe what they are saying”. Now, Goldberg has a 
point here when he claims that since lawyers asserts many things in the course of 
his argumentation qua professionals, they exemplify clear cases in which one 
asserts that p but one may not belive that p. 
It is clear that assertion, as Peirce conceived it, usually expresses belief, for 
under normal circumstances one would not undertake a responsibility to 
vindicate a proposition one does not believe. However, one should grant that 
there are cases of insincere assertion, namely, cases in which one asserts that p 
but one does not believe that p. Peirce’s view explain these cases by noticing that 
one may not believe that p and still undertake a commitment to vindicate p.  
This is not a high price to pay. On the contrary, it seems that such view is 
consistent with Peirce’s fallibilist approach. Although assertion usually expresses 
belief, it is not an act based on first-person authority. One may believe that one’s 
client is guilty and still commit to vindicate her innocence. Obviously, at this 
point, no one has established whether the client is innocent or guilty. In the 
course of building up one’s case, one may find irrefutable evidence determining 
that one’s client is innocent. Thus, at the beginning of a trial, bound by one’s 
profession as a lawyer, one can assert that one’s client is innocent and believe the 
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opposite. However, at the end of the trial, one can find out that one asserted 
correctly and thus the belief one entertained before was false.  
In connection to this last point, let us return to the lawyer’s case. Suppose 
that John’s lawyer is at a family dinner. When dessert is served, she utters “John 
is guilty”. Such utterance might be interpreted as equivalent to “I believe that 
John is guilty”. It now becomes clear that her commitment to vindicate that John 
is innocent is simply a case of assertion and disbelief. There is a clear difference 
between honouring one’s duty to defend that p and believing that p. For it is 
possible that one does not believe that p and still one undertakes a commitment 
to vindicate that p. Thus, a fortiori, John’s lawyer can vindicate claims she does 
not believe. Evidently, she would violate the sincerity condition (i.e. one should 
assert that p only if one believes that p), but an insincere assertion is still an 
assertion.  
In sum, if one understands the vindicatory commitment involved in the 
lawyer case in terms of Peirce’s dialogical interpretation of “vindicatory 
commitment”, the claim that the contract committing John’s lawyer to vindicate 
that John is innocent should count as an assertion that he is innocent gains 
enough plausibility.  
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Conclusion 
 
Peirce defended the following view of assertion: 
(A) To assert a proposition p is to undertake a responsibility for the truth of p.  
In this dissertation, I interpreted (A) and assessed Peirce’s reasons for holding it. 
I did this in two steps.  
The first step was to reconstruct how Peirce came to (A) according to the 
textual evidence present in (EP 2.140), (EP 2.312-313), and (CP 5.546). As I 
showed in Chapter 1, this textual evidence suggests that Peirce’s account of 
assertion might take the form of the following argument:   
(1) Ordinary assertions sufficiently resemble its paradigms (i.e. solemn 
assertions) (plausible assumption). 
(2) Whenever one solemnly asserts that p, one thereby undertakes an overt 
responsibility for the truth of p (by inspection of paradigmatic cases of 
assertion).  
Therefore, 
(3) Whenever one asserts that p, one is responsible for the truth of p.  
Here Peirce glossed “being responsible” as “being responsible to do something”, 
namely, giving reasons for the proposition asserted. 
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In section 2.2., I examined (1). I motivated this assumption as follows: 
although there is a distinction between assertive verbs concerning the strength of 
their asserting, all assertive verbs constitute different ways of making assertions. 
Hence, it is plausible to assume that ordinary assertions sufficiently resemble its 
paradigms.  
In section 2.3., I discussed Peirce’s inspection of three cases of solemn 
assertion. The outcome of Peirce’s inspection is precisely  (2): since asserters are 
answerable for the direct consequences their acts of assertion have on their 
addresseess, solemn asserters are agents that overtly undertake a responsibility 
for the truth of a proposition. 
I made two qualifications concerning Peirce’s argument. First, I noticed 
that this argument intends to establish the plausibility of the idea that performing 
an assertion has a normative effect on the speaker. Second, I noticed that the 
reconstructed argument accounts only for the claim that asserting has a 
normative effect on the speaker and not for the claim that one should characterize 
assertion in terms of such effect.  
However, since either Peirce thought that the conclusion of the above 
argument provides good reasons to take this feature of assertion as what 
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qualifies it as a speech act or Peirce adopted the principle of pragmatism as a 
tacit methodological principle, I formulated Peirce's view of assertion as follows:  
      (A1) One asserts that p if and only if one is responsible for giving reason for p.  
At this point, I moved to the second step, which was to interpret (A1). In 
order to accomplish this goal, I distinguished three aspects of (A1). These aspects 
determined the agenda for the subsequent chapters.  
In chapter 2, I addresed the first aspect, which is the nature of assertion as 
the state of being responsible for the truth of a proposition. I defended that Peirce 
held a moral interpretation of the responsibility involved in assertion. Based 
mainly on (EP 2.278) and (CP 5.546), I showed that Peirce held that when 
speakers enagage in assertoric speech, they should be treated as moral agents.  
I argued that since Peirce thought that asserters are punishable and 
blamable in virtue of performing acts of assertion, it follows that Peirce was 
committed to the view that asserters are moral agents. In turn, since moral 
agency implies moral responsibility, I concluded that the responsibility involved 
in asserting is a moral responsibility. As such, one can evalute speakers’ 
assertions as correct or incorrect. Thus, speakers are subject to blame and praise. 
This is the moral dimmension of communication and speech.  
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Accordingly, if one integrates this qualification into (A1), one can 
reformulate Peirce’s view of assertion as follows:   
     (A2) One asserts that p if and only if one is morally responsible for giving   
              reasons for p. 
In Chapter 3, I addressed the second aspect, which is the nature of 
propositions as what can be asserted. I tackled this aspect by interpreting Peirce’s 
view that a proposition is an assertable sign. Following Peirce’s use of the term 
“sign”, I discussed what means for a proposition to be a sign. Then, I proposed to 
interpret Peircean propositions as types. This interpretation hinges on (EP 2.311-
312). Since Peirce claimed that all types require tokens, propositions have no 
existence. Their ontological status is plain: occurrences of sentences as used in 
speech.  
After considering Peirce’s view of the relation of aboutness (i.e. how it is 
possible for us to say something about something by using propositions), in 
which context-sensitivity plays a major role (CP 2.357), I spelled out in a more 
precise way the criterion of identity of propositions, which is different from that 
of utterances and speech acts. The relation between assertions and propositions 
bears on this criterion. The utterance of sentences such as “The actual prime 
minister of Curitiba is left-handed”, which according to Peirce are not assertable 
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(since this sentence says nothing and there is no possible way to give reasons in 
such case), are not proposition-tokens. By contrast, if one asserts by means of 
uttering sentence such as “The moon is made of cheese”, which is an assertable 
sentence, one tokens a proposition. Evidently, in this example one asserted 
incorrectly, for such proposition is false, but meaningful.  
Accordingly, I concluded that propositions are assertable types in the 
sense that their criteria of identity depends on the possibility of its assertion. 
Indeed, Peirce thought that if one says that a proposition is not assertable, one is 
contradicting oneself. The reason for this contradiction is that if a proposition is 
not assertable, then it would not be tokened, and, since all types require tokens, it 
would not be a proposition.  
In Chapter 4, I addressed the third and final aspect of Peirce´s view of 
assertion, which is the nature of the responsibility for truth as a commitment to 
give reasons. I argued that Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of 
vindicatory commitment. I did this by drawing from Peirce’s dialogical 
semantics for quantifiers, as it is presented in (CP 2.523), (CP 2.453), and (EP 
2.168), the view that a dialogical interpersonal structure should embed assertoric 
practice.  
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According to this interpersonal structure, one understands the practice of 
giving and asking for reasons, so to speak, as a dialogical interplay of deontic 
statuses: the speaker’s duty to defend and the interpreter’s right to attack are 
essential and irreducible elements of the practice of assertion. In other words, I 
supported two claims based on Peirce's dialogical semantics for the quantifiers. 
First, that Peirce construed the relation between the asserter and addressee as a 
symmetrical relation. Second, that Peirce construed the perspectives of the 
asserter and the listener as those of a first-person and a second-person 
respectively.  
From these two claims, it follows that Peirce interpreted “vindicatory 
commitment” in terms of a dialogical responsibility to give reasons upon 
challenge. This means that if one is responsible for the truth of p, one’s listener 
acquires the right to challenge p by asking for reasons while one undertakes the 
duty to defend p by giving reasons. A corollary of this interpretation is that by 
“reasons”, Peirce meant good reasons. Accordingly, I reformulated (A2) as 
follows:  
 (A3) A speaker S asserts that p if and only if S has the moral duty  
          to defend p by giving good reasons to a listener L and L has  
          the right to challenge p by asking for reasons.  
168 
 
 
I noted that a first consequence of (A3) is that asserting a proposition is 
quite a different action from telling that it is true. If one endorses (A3), one is 
committed to the view that one can assert a proposition and fail to give reasons 
for it or one’s listener may prove one wrong. The right thing to do in such cases 
is to retract oneself. According to (A3), assertion is not an all-or-nothing business. 
The possibility of retraction is part of assertoric practice.  
In addition, a second consequence of (A3) is that the relation between 
assertion and truth originates at the boundary between language and the world, 
which is action. Accordingly, asserting a proposition-token relates to certain 
actions concerning the object signified by the proposition that would lead to 
evaluate its correctness. The proposition asserted is true if these actions show 
that it fits the world or, in other words, if these actions show that the proposition 
asserted is not challengeable by an opponent in the long run.  
Finally, in chapter 5, I introduced two objections to Peirce’s view of 
assertion. In replying to the first objection, the inferential integration test, Peirce’s 
view of propositions as types and their criteria of identity in terms of the 
possibility of its assertion proved to be fruitful. In turn, the above two 
consequences of (A3) paved the way for a reply to the second objection, the 
lawyer case, in terms of the difference between asserting and believing.  
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I would like to end by remarking that in expounding Peirce’s account of 
assertion, I attempted to achieve a modest aim. To be sure, exploring further 
implications and objections to Peirce’s view of assertion, and fleshing out the 
relation between assertion and the key concepts of Peirce’s logic are much more 
intricate projects. Here I hope only to have taken a step forward in the task of 
clarifying Peirce’s view of assertion and to have offered some reasons to believe 
that this view sheds light on the distinctive character of assertion. 
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